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ABSTRACT
Essays on the Liquidity of Financial Markets
by
Christina Zafeiridou
Co–Chairs: Stefan Nagel and Paolo Pasquariello
This dissertation examines the effects of political uncertainty surrounding the out-
come of U.S. presidential elections on financial market quality – i.e., the ability of a
market to price assets correctly – as well as the liquidity spillovers across four asset
classes traded in U.S. futures markets.
In the first chapter of the dissertation, entitled “Political Uncertainty, Liquidity,
and Information Asymmetry”and co–authored with Paolo Pasquariello, we examine
the effects of political uncertainty, as captured by the U.S. Presidential elections, on
financial market liquidity, returns, and volatility. We find that liquidity deteriorates
(trading volume decreases, fraction of zero returns increase) in the months leading
up to the presidential elections (when political uncertainty is higher), but it improves
(trading volume increases, price impact and fraction of zero returns decrease) in the
months following the elections. We also find that average stock returns are higher
xii
both before and after the elections. The effects are more pronounced for more un-
certain elections and more politically sensitive firms. We postulate that the effects
of political uncertainty on financial markets depend on a positive relation between
political uncertainty and information asymmetry among investors, ambiguity about
the quality of their information, or dispersion of their beliefs. To test these hypothe-
ses, we use direct proxies for market wide information asymmetry and disagreement,
and find that the proxies only for the former are significantly affected by political
uncertainty. These findings provide the strongest support for the predictions of the
ambiguity hypothesis.
In the second chapter of the dissertation, entitled “Liquidity Spillovers Across
Asset Classes”, I argue that liquidity spillovers – i.e., the transmissions of liquidity
shocks from one asset to another – are an important yet not fully understood feature
of price formation in financial markets. Using a reduced–form VAR, I measure the
liquidity spillovers across four assets in the U.S. futures market and find significant
evidence of liquidity spillovers across these assets, especially during periods of fi-
nancial and macroeconomic turmoil. My findings also suggest that these spillovers
are driven by liquidity supply channels (as opposed to information channels): when
liquidity providers face higher funding constraints, liquidity spillovers across assets
increase.
xiii
CHAPTER I
Political Uncertainty, Liquidity and Information
Asymmetry
Long before the appointed day [of a Presidential election]
arrives, the election becomes the greatest, and one might say
the only, affair occupying men’s minds. . .
– Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1848
1.1 Introduction
Political uncertainty matters. Many recent studies conjecture that uncertainty
about political outcomes has important effects on asset returns and corporate de-
cisions.1 We study the uncertainty regarding the outcome of the U.S. Presidential
elections and conjecture that political uncertainty is greater in the months prior to
those elections (relative to non-election periods) but is resolved once the outcome
1e.g., see Pantzalis et al. (2000), Bernhard and Leblang (2006), Bialkowski et al. (2008), Durnev
(2011), Bond and Goldstein (2015), Pa´stor and Veronesi (2012), Julio and Yook (2012), Goodell
and Vahamaa (2013), Belo et al. (2013), Pa´stor and Veronesi (2013), and Boutchkova et al. (2012).
1
of the elections is determined. Our conjecture is based on the idea that in most
developed economies, political uncertainty pertains primarily to possible changes in
government policy or national leadership. Having defined a measure of political un-
certainty, we then study liquidity and returns in the presence of political uncertainty.
We find that (1) prior to U.S. Presidential elections, as compared to non–election
periods, liquidity in the financial markets deteriorates, returns are on average higher,
and volatility decreases, and (2) in the months following the elections, liquidity im-
proves, returns continue to be higher, and volatility increases. We also show that
these results are due to a positive relationship between political uncertainty and
information asymmetry, i.e., the quantity of information available to investors.
Liquidity plays a central role in the functioning of financial markets and many
pages have been rightfully devoted to measuring it and identifying its determinants.
What has received less attention empirically however, is how liquidity changes in
the presence of uncertainty and why. The effects of uncertainty are especially rele-
vant in light of the recent liquidity dry–ups and subsequent, financial and liquidity
crises.2 A priori, uncertainty has an unclear effect on liquidity. To measure liquid-
ity we concentrate on trading volume, the fraction of zero returns, and the Amihud
(2002) illiquidity measure because of both their widespread use and their strong link
with the theoretical microstructure literature on the process of price formation in
financial markets in the presence of uncertainty (e.g., see Vives (2008) and Goyenko
et al. (2009)). To examine why uncertainty may affect liquidity, we first rely on the
theoretical literature to identify the possible channels and we then test the empirical
2see, for instance, Gromb and Vayanos (2012) and Cespa and Foucault (2014)
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predictions of each channel.
We conjecture that political uncertainty may affect liquidity and the price forma-
tion process via three channels related to information asymmetry, ambiguity, and dis-
agreement. Miller (1977) notes that uncertainty implies dispersion of beliefs among
market participants, which according to Varian (1985) can arise either because of
differences in information or differences in opinion (i.e., disagreement). Subsequent
literature (e.g., Epstein and Schneider (2008)) suggests that differences in infor-
mation are either due to differences in information quantity or information quality.
Information asymmetry refers to the dispersion in the quantity of information that
investors possess, whereas ambiguity to the dispersion in the quality of information.
The information asymmetry channel conjectures that information asymmetry and
uncertainty are positively correlated. As a result, during periods of high political
uncertainty, adverse selection risk is higher and therefore, liquidity lower. The ambi-
guity channel assumes that during high uncertainty periods, the quality of investors’
information is higher, which in turn leads to lower trading volume and deteriorating
liquidity. Finally, the disagreement channel conjectures that greater uncertainty in-
creases differences in opinion among market participants, leading to higher trading
volume and, under certain conditions, improved liquidity.
These three hypotheses make distinct predictions (summarized in Table 1.1) re-
garding the impact of uncertainty on liquidity, returns, and volatility. As noted
earlier, we test these predictions by using all U.S. presidential elections between
1926 and 2012 as a proxy of political uncertainty over our sample period and in-
vestigate its effects on trading volume, the fraction of zero returns, and the Amihud
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(2002) illiquidity measure. We find that trading volume decreases in the months
preceding presidential elections and increases in the months immediately following
the elections. Popular measures of illiquidity continuously available over our long
sample period (Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure (1927) and the fraction of zero
returns (1927) significantly increase in the months before and decline in the months
after the elections. The effects of political uncertainty on liquidity are larger during
more uncertain elections (i.e., with smaller popular vote margin and final Gallup
survey results), consistent with the notion that political uncertainty is higher prior
to the elections and dissipates once their outcome is determined. These effects are
in addition more pronounced for politically sensitive industries and firms.
Recent works have also shown that firm performance under different ruling parties
varies, presumably due to the differential effects of government policies. Santa-Clara
and Valkanov (2003), for instance, show that stock returns are on average higher
under the Democratic party. In line with the current literature, we also show that
the Democratic party, whether it is the incumbent party or the winning party, has
a more positive effect on market liquidity and market returns, both prior and after
the presidential elections. These results further reinforce our hypothesis that our
findings are driven by political uncertainty.
These results are consistent with the predictions of the information asymmetry
and ambiguity hypotheses, but not the disagreement hypothesis. To further test
the former hypotheses, we examine the impact of political uncertainty on working
capital accruals – a common measure of information asymmetry – and the analysts’
forecasts dispersion – a common measure of differences of opinion. We show that
4
working capital accruals increase prior to U.S. presidential elections and decrease
following the elections. We find no effect on analysts’ forecast dispersion. These
results provide evidence in favor of the information asymmetry hypothesis.
Cross-sectional analysis provides further insights about the determinants of the
effects of political uncertainty on liquidity. If the ambiguity hypothesis is true, we ex-
pect these effects to be most pronounced for more “speculative” and difficult-to-value
stocks (e.g., Baker and Wurgler (2007); Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)). Using
size and market beta portfolios, we find no varying effect of political uncertainty
on the process of price formation for smaller stocks and stocks with lower market
beta. Again, these dynamics are consistent with the predictions of the information
asymmetry hypothesis and suggest that political uncertainty does not decrease the
quality of information available to speculators but rather the quantity. That is, when
political uncertainty is high, investors are less informed.
These findings provide the strongest — albeit only indirect — support for the
predictions of the information asymmetry hypothesis. Time-varying ambiguity is
elusive and difficult to measure and we thus cannot test it directly.
Our paper is related to recent empirical and theoretical studies on presidential
elections around the world and their effects on firm-level investment, stock returns,
and return volatility (e.g., Pantzalis et al. (2000), Bernhard and Leblang (2006),
Durnev (2011), Bialkowski et al. (2008), Goodell and Vahamaa (2013), Julio and
Yook (2012), Pa´stor and Veronesi (2012), Pa´stor and Veronesi (2013), Boutchkova
et al. (2012)). For instance, Julio and Yook (2012) document cycles in corporate
investment in correspondence with the timing of national elections in 48 countries
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between 1980 and 2005. Goodell and Vahamaa (2013) show that political uncertainty
around U.S. presidential elections affects option-implied stock market volatility inso-
far as the winner of the presidential elections becomes more uncertain. Boutchkova
et al. (2012) show that this effect is stronger for firms operating in politically sensitive
industries. Pa´stor and Veronesi (2012) and Pa´stor and Veronesi (2013) develop a
general equilibrium model to show that government policy uncertainty and political
uncertainty, respectively, may have ambiguous effects on stock prices because of their
effects on both future cash flows and discount rates (e.g., by exposing stocks to an
additional source of non-diversifiable risk). Relative to these studies, our focus is on
the determinants and implications of investors’ behavior for financial market quality
when political uncertainty is high.
In the rest of the paper, we proceed as follows. In Section 1.2 we further discuss
our notion of political uncertainty relative to the existing literature. In Section 1.3
we discuss in detail the three hypotheses. We describe our data and empirical design
in Section 1.4 and present our results. Section 2.6 concludes.
1.2 Political Uncertainty
Within the political science literature, political uncertainty typically refers to the
lack of sureness or absence of strict determination in political life. As Dahl et al.
(1963) note, uncertainty appears to be an important characteristic of all political
life. Elections, wars, governmental processes, threats, and other political phenomena
are all inherently uncertain political occurrences (Cioffi (2008)). In this study, we
define political uncertainty as the uncertainty regarding the outcome of U.S. Pres-
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idential elections. We concentrate on presidential elections because in developed
countries with stable political regimes, such as the United States, regularly sched-
uled Presidential elections are (exogenous) political events that define who holds
office. Therefore, the timing of Presidential elections does not depend on economic
conditions or business cycles.
One may argue that political uncertainty is merely a reflection of policy uncer-
tainty. These two forms of uncertainty, while related, use distinct features. Policy
uncertainty is the uncertainty regarding any government policies (monetary and fiscal
policies) and their impact on economic activity or financial markets (e.g., Pa´stor and
Veronesi (2012), Pa´stor and Veronesi (2013), Pasquariello (2014)). A popular index
of economic policy uncertainty is developed by Baker et al. (2015) and is comprised
of news coverage about policy related economic uncertainty, tax code expiration, and
analysts’ disagreement. Insofar as there may be uncertainty about the government
policies proposed by competing candidates for office, political uncertainty may also
stem from policy uncertainty. Political uncertainty however is broader in scope for
it entails greater uncertainty regarding the possible states of nature that can occur.
In particular, political uncertainty encompasses both uncertainty about the election
outcome and uncertainty about the policies that may ensue from that outcome.
Another important distinction is the one between political uncertainty and eco-
nomic uncertainty. Economic uncertainty is the uncertainty regarding the economic
conditions or the business cycles. Economic uncertainty may affect political uncer-
tainty since during periods of high economic uncertainty the uncertainty regarding
who wins the Presidential elections may increase. This raises the possibility that
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any investigation of the impact of political uncertainty on market quality may be
plagued by endogeneity concerns. For instance, both market quality and political
uncertainty may be amplified by economic uncertainty surrounding downturns in
economic activity or outright recessions. However, as noted in the Introduction, in
our study we make the important identification assumption that, although being pos-
sibly state-dependent, political uncertainty is always higher in the months leading to
U.S. presidential elections and lower once their outcome is determined. Of course,
economic conditions may (and often do) affect political outcomes as well. Nonethe-
less, given the above assumption, endogeneity concerns are mitigated by our prior
observation that the timing of U.S. presidential elections is exogenous to current and
expected economic uncertainty.
If, however, our identification assumption is not supported, then our results may
be driven by political business cycles (“election year economics”) rather than po-
litical uncertainty. As Alesina (1988) notes, “social planners” and “representative
consumers” do not exist. Politicians are driven by their incentive to be re-elected
(“office-motivated” politicians; e.g., see Nordhaus (1975), Rogoff (1987)). Office-
motivated politicians can manipulate monetary and fiscal policy instruments to in-
fluence the level of economic activity and increase their chances of being re-elected.
Under this scenario, our results may merely reflect the peaks and troughs of the po-
litical business cycle. However, according to Drazen (2001), there is much less hard
evidence about the prevalence of “election-year economics” in developed countries
(and especially in the United States) than suggested by both the aforementioned
theoretical models and conventional wisdom. For instance, Drazen (2001) (p. 76)
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observes that “although there is wide — but not universal — agreement that ag-
gregate economic conditions affect election outcomes in the United States, there is
significant disagreement about whether there is opportunistic manipulation that can
be observed in the macro data.” Thus, we argue that U.S. presidential elections may
provide a clean setting to examine the effects of political uncertainty on financial
market quality.
1.3 Hypotheses
Motivated by the theoretical literature on market microstructure and uncertainty,
we conjecture that political uncertainty may affect market quality via three channels
related to information asymmetry, ambiguity, and disagreement. With the infor-
mation asymmetry hypothesis we assume that political uncertainty, as a source of
fundamental uncertainty, may affect the information asymmetry between informed
and uninformed investors, or investors and firms. Numerous rational expectations
equilibrium (REE) models since Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) illustrate this linkage.
Intuitively, greater fundamental uncertainty — e.g., before Presidential elections,
when political uncertainty is likely higher — makes private fundamental information
more valuable, thus increasing adverse selection risk. The opposite would then occur
after those elections. The effects of information asymmetry on market quality in
REE models are less clear. According to Wang (1994), greater information asymme-
try leads to lower trading volume as it decreases the informativeness of asset prices.
However, informed trading volume may also increase with political uncertainty if
liquidity trading is exogenous and inelastic, as in Kyle (1985). In addition, greater
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adverse selection risk may increase market-makers’ inventory cost, leading to lower
market liquidity — e.g., higher bid-ask spreads (Ho and Stoll (1981), Amihud and
Mendelson (1986)) or lower depth (Kyle (1985)) — and consequently higher fraction
of zero returns and Roll’s price impact.
With the ambiguity hypothesis we postulate that greater political uncertainty
may lead to greater ambiguity about the quality of information available to market
participants. Standard REE models (e.g., Vives (1995a); Vives (1995b)) assume
investors’ information to be of known quality. Recent studies (e.g., Epstein and
Schneider (2008); Ozsoylev and Werner (2011)) extend these models to incorporate
ambiguity by allowing investors to have a distribution of beliefs about the mean
and/or variance of the fundamentals of the traded asset. For instance, in the model
of Ozsoylev and Werner (2011), greater fundamental uncertainty distorts the quality
(rather than the quantity) of investors’ information by worsening the ambiguity of
their prior beliefs about asset fundamentals. Faced with greater such uncertainty,
ambiguity-averse investors and arbitrageurs may choose to trade less or not trade at
all. Thus, in this setting trading volume and liquidity would decline prior to U.S.
elections — when both political uncertainty and ambiguity of information quality
are high — and improve afterwards, once the election outcome is determined.
Finally, with the disagreement hypothesis we conjecture that greater political un-
certainty may increase differences in opinion among market participants. In hetero-
geneous beliefs models (e.g., Banerjee and Kremer (2010), Hong and Stein (2007)),
greater fundamental uncertainty increases disagreement among investors about the
fundamental value of the traded asset, leading them to trade more with one another,
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i.e., increasing equilibrium trading volume. Thus, trading volume may first increase
in the months preceding presidential elections — when both political uncertainty and
accompanying information heterogeneity among market participants are likely high
— and then decrease afterwards, when political uncertainty is resolved. However,
according to Pasquariello and Vega (2007) and Pasquariello and Vega (2009) more
heterogeneously informed speculators may instead trade more cautiously (i.e., less,
rather than more) with their private information, leading to deteriorating trading
volume and market liquidity.
These three hypotheses make distinct predictions (summarized in Table 1.1) re-
garding the impact of uncertainty on market quality.
11
Table 1.1: Hypotheses
This Table reports a brief description of the hypotheses and a summary of their main predictions regarding trading volume and
liquidity (the fraction of zero returns and Roll’s impact) in the months preceding and following the presidential elections. The
plus (minus) sign (+) indicates an increase (decrease), the question mark (?) the fact that no predictions have been developed,
and the plus-minus sign (+/−) that there are theories that predict both an increase and a decrease in the corresponding variable.
Hypothesis Description Trading Volume Liquidity
Before After Before After
Information Asymmetry Higher political uncertainty increases information asymmetry be-
tween informed and uninformed investors.
+/– +/– – +
Ambiguity Higher political uncertainty increases the ambiguity about the in-
formation quality.
– + + –
Disagreement Higher political uncertainty increases divergence in opinions. +/– +/– +/? –/?
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1.4 Data
1.4.1 Election Data
Our analysis focuses on U.S. presidential elections from 1926 to 2012. The U.S
presidential elections are held every four years, the Tuesday between November 2nd
and 8th. Traditionally, there have been two major political parties participating,
Democratic and Republican.3 The candidates are nominated through a series of pri-
mary elections and caucuses. This process however, is not part of the U.S. Constitu-
tion and as a result, the exact time that the nominees are selected is not pre-specified
and in fact, has varied a lot across elections.4 We thus choose to study the effects
of the presidential elections over a fixed window of six months around the actual
election day (from August pre–election to April post–election).
We consider 21 U.S. presidential elections from 1926 until 2012.5 Table 1.2 shows
summary characteristics of the presidential elections; incumbent president and party,
winning candidate and party, popular vote margin and the margin of the final Gallup
survey prior to the elections. The data on the U.S. presidential elections have been
collected from CQPress and Gallup.6
3During the elections of 1968, 1980, 1992, 1996 and 2000, however, there were three candidates.
4For instance, in the 1976 elections, the Republican’s party nominee was not selected until the
party’s national convention when the incumbent President, Gerald Ford, narrowly defeated Ronald
Reagan.
5There are 22 elections between 1926 and 2012, we however, exclude the presidential elections
of 2000 between George W. Bush (R) and Al Gore (D) because of its unusual progression.
6http://www.cqpress.com
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Table 1.2: Election Characteristics
This table reports summary characteristics of U.S. presidential elections from 1926 to 2012. The
characteristics we report are the year of elections, whether there was an incumbent President, the
incumbent party and the winner party, the popular vote margin, and the Final Gallup Survey. We
use two different specifications of uncertain elections; by the popular vote margins and the results
of the final Gallup survey. The highlighted popular vote and survey margins are the top 7 we use
in order to define uncertain elections. They overlap in most cases with the exception of 1952 and
1992 elections. We exclude the presidential elections of 2000 (George W. Bush vs. Al Gore) from
all of our tests because the final winner in those elections was determined in December 12th, 2000.
Year Incumbent Incumbent Party Winner Party Margin Gallup
1928 Republican H. Hoover Republican 17.41%
1932 H. Hoover Republican F. Roosevelt Democratic 17.76%
1936 F. Roosevelt Democratic F. Roosevelt Democratic 24.26% 11.4%
1940 F. Roosevelt Democratic F. Roosevelt Democratic 9.96% 4%
1944 F. Roosevelt Democratic F. Roosevelt Democratic 7.50% 3%
1948 Democratic H. Truman Democratic 4.48% 5%
1952 Democratic D. Eisenhower Republican 10.85% 2%
1956 D. Eisenhower Republican D. Eisenhower Republican 15.40% 19%
1960 Republican J. Kennedy Democratic 0.17% 0.5%
1964 Democratic L. Johnson Democratic 22.58% 28%
1968 Democratic R. Nixon Republican 0.6% 1%
1972 R. Nixon Republican R. Nixon Republican 23.16% 24%
1976 Republican J. Carter Democratic 2.7% 1%
1980 J. Carter Democratic R. Reagan Republican 9.74% 3%
1984 R. Reagan Republican R. Reagan Republican 14.21% 18%
1988 Republican G.H. Bush Republican 7.72% 12%
1992 G.H.Bush Republican B. Clinton Democratic 5.56% 12%
1996 B. Clinton Democratic B. Clinton Democratic 8.52% 3%
2000 Democratic G.W. Bush Republican 0.51% 2%
2004 G.W. Bush Republican G. W. Bush Republican 2.46% 0%
2008 Republican B. Obama Democratic 7.21% 11%
2012 B. Obama Democratic B. Obama Democratic 3.86% 1%
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1.4.2 Financial Market Data
We measure monthly equity returns and liquidity using daily data from CRSP for
all stocks listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX from 1926 to 2013. NYSE and
AMEX stocks span the whole period from 1926 to 2013, but NASDAQ stocks enter
the sample in 1973 when it was first introduced. We include only common stocks
(CRSP share code 10 and 11) and as conventional, omit ADRs, SBIs, REITs, and
closed-end funds. We implement additional filters to exclude any outliers that may
drive or distort our results. Hence, we exclude stocks with zero trading or whose
price is missing (or is below $0.5). We also winsorize the data at the top and bottom
5% trading volume and 1% returns. Additionally, we only include stocks that have
been listed and actively traded in either of the exchanges for at least 3 years.
Table 1.3 shows the number of firms in our sample. Overall, there are 17,102
unique stocks for the period 1926-2013 that meet our criteria. After the recent
financial crisis however, there has been a significant drop in the number of firms that
are listed on the exchanges.
On the account of the well known double counting issue related to NASDAQ
volume (Atkins and Dyl (1997)) and the fact that the structure and capitalization
differences between NASDAQ and NYSE may have important implications for the
measurement and behavior of volume, most of the empirical literature analyzes the
two exchanges separately. Particularly, the double counting issue arises because
NASDAQ is primarily a dealer market, whereas the NYSE is an auction market. For
instance, when an investor sells 100 shares of a firm x to a dealer, the dealer reports
a 100-share transaction; when another investor buys these 100 shares of firm x from
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the dealer, the dealer reports another 100-share transaction. The reported trading
volume for firm x is 200 shares, when only 100 shares have been exchanged between
the two investors. Thus, the reported trading volume on the NASDAQ is overstated
(Atkins and Dyl (1997)). For our purposes however these differences do not play a
major role. Thus, in the main regression specification we do not separate between
the exchanges.
1.4.3 Cumulative Excess Returns and Measures of Liquidity
Our analysis focuses on equity returns and liquidity around the U.S. presidential
elections, starting from pre–election August, to post–election January, until post–
inauguration April. We measure three month cumulative excess returns and liquidity
for the specified period with a special emphasis on the pre–election (from August
to October) and post–election (from November to January). The cumulative excess
returns are in excess of the value–weighted market portfolio. Table 1.3, panel A,
reports the average monthly returns from 1926 to 2013 and subperiods.
We proxy liquidity through trading volume, the Amihud (2002) illiquidity mea-
sure, and the fraction of zero returns. Although the empirical microstructure litera-
ture has developed many proxies for liquidity, we concentrate on these three measures
because they can be easily interpreted and computed using daily data.
Trading volume is a natural measure of trading activity, although, it does not
always comove with liquidity; during several low liquidity periods trading volume
has been shown to increase. Nonetheless, it is a measure of the quantity traded and
as such, it plays an important role in the determination of equilibrium prices. As a
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measure of volume we use the log share turnover.7 For each individual stock i, we
define 3–month share turnover in period t as:
τi,t =
Vi,t
Ni,t
, (1.1)
where Vit is the total 3–month share volume of stock i, and Ni are the number of
shares outstanding of stock i. Table 1.3, panel B, reports the summary statistics
for the 3–month turnover from 1926 to 2013 and subperiods. Turnover exhibits
positive skewness – it cannot be negative – and has a very fat tail (1210 kurtosis in
1926-2013)8. To correct for these characteristics we apply the logarithmic function:
log(τi,t) = log(
Vi,t
Ni,t
) . (1.2)
Table 1.3, panel C, shows the transformed skewness and kurtosis, -0.251 and 3.552
respectively, which match closely the skewness and kurtosis of a normal distribution,
allowing us to perform OLS regressions.9
7Extended discussion and theoretical justification of the measure can be found in Lo and Wang
(2001).
8The extreme skewness (111) and kurtosis (33297) in the subperiod 1957-1986 are driven by
the October 1987 crash. The anomalous properties for both returns and volume in the 1986-1987
period have been well documented in the empirical literature.
9Several studies have documented that trading volume exhibits characteristics of non–
stationarity and a time-trend. To address the issue of the time trend we use year fixed effects
and refrain from using any de-trending techniques. Lo and Wang (2001) apply several such tech-
niques on the turnover time series and show that the characteristics of the de-trended series vary
across the de-trending methods. Thus, they conclude that it is optimum to use the raw turnover.
Non–stationarity is addressed with changes.
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Amihud (2002) defines the illiquidity of stock i in the 3–month period t as:
ILLIQi,t =
1
ni,t
ni,t∑
d=1
|ri,t,d|
DVi,t,d
, (1.3)
where ni,t are the number of trading days in period t for stock i and DVi,t,d is dollar
trading volume (Price × V olume) on day d in period t for stock i. To adjust the
size of the measure, the Amihud (2002) is typically multiplied by 106. The monthly
Amihud (2002) measure is a proxy for price impact, i.e., the monthly price response
associated with a given dollar trading volume. It is thus a measure of illiquidity ; the
higher the change in price for a given trading volume, the more illiquid the asset. The
Amihud (2002) measure is intuitive and simple to compute and is widely accepted
as a good measure of illiquidity. Hasbrouck (2002) shows that “among the [liquidity]
proxies . . . , the illiquidity measure appears to be the best” at capturing Kyle’s λ.
Panel D in table 1.3 shows the summary statistics for the Amihud illiquidity measure.
As one would have probably expected, U.S. stocks are on average less liquid during
the recent financial crisis, post–2007. Also, given that the measure can only have
positive values, it is naturally skewed.
Finally, following Lesmond et al. (1999) we calculate the fraction of zero returns
for stock i in period t as following:
Zerosi,t =
(#of days with zero returns)i,t
ni,t
(1.4)
where ni,t is the number of trading days in 3–month period t for stock i. This
measure is again a measure of illiquidity; the higher is the fraction of days with
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zero returns the more illiquid is the asset. Although not a widely used measure of
liquidity, we nonetheless choose to use it because Goyenko et al. (2009) show that
zeros outperform other measures of liquidity both when using high frequency data
and daily/monthly data. Table 1.3, panel E, shows the first four moments of the
measure. On average 20% of the days exhibit zero returns, with a relatively low
variance.
1.5 Empirical Results
In this section we present the empirical findings of the paper. We first document
the positive excess return and decrease in liquidity in the August–November period
prior to the U.S. presidential elections and reversal in the October–January post–
election period. We then look at
1.5.1 Returns and Liquidity around the U.S. Presidential Elections
To quantify the impact of the U.S. presidential elections on returns and liquidity
during the pre– and post–election periods we run the following dummy variable
regression model:
yit = µi + λt + qt + β11t(Election) + βxXit + εit , (1.5)
where y ∈ {Retit, log(τit), ILLIQit, Zerosit, V OLit} and Election is either a pre–
Election, post–Election, or post–Inauguration dummy. The pre–Election period is
from August to October, the post–Election from November to January, and the
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Table 1.3: Liquidity and Return Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics of the 3–month log excess percentage returns, percentage
turnover, log turnover, Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, fraction of zero returns, as defined in
section 1.4.3. The data contain both NYSE and NASDAQ stocks, from 1926 to 2012. We include
stocks with at least 3 years of consecutive observations. The summary statistics are the mean,
standard deviation (SD), skewness, kurtosis and the number of firms traded at each period.
Period Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis No. of Firms
Panel A: 3–Month Log Excess Return (%)
1926-2013 -0.011 0.228 -0.543 12.51 17,102
1926-1950 0.004 0.188 0.174 11.23 1,218
1951-1986 0.0008 0.192 -0.038 8.067 9,139
1987-1998 -0.031 0.256 -0.814 12.35 10,388
1999-2006 -0.007 0.265 -0.181 11.35 7,721
2007-2013 -0.022 0.257 -0.974 13.78 4,593
Panel B: 3–Month Turnover (%)
1926-2013 232.8 422.5 18.18 1211
1926-1950 120.1 342.4 21.90 852.1
1951-1986 101.6 164.8 111.3 33297
1987-1998 238.5 323.2 8.045 223.5
1999-2006 404.4 679.9 19.22 899.0
2007-2013 545.3 636.4 5.615 87.16
Panel C: 3–Month Log Turnover (%)
1926-2013 4.667 1.303 -0.251 3.552
1926-1950 3.851 1.376 -0.390 4.992
1951-1986 4.106 1.045 -0.311 4.028
1987-1998 4.889 1.158 -0.543 4.139
1999-2006 5.367 1.200 -0.421 3.350
2007-2013 5.731 1.219 -0.803 3.818
Panel D: 3–Month Amihud Measure
1926-2013 4.034 2288 110.8 21365
1926-1950 16.42 133.7 44.28 3194
1951-1986 2.499 13.03 54.06 8542
1987-1996 3.832 1358 89.50 14467
1997-2006 1.335 7.706 28.16 1440
2007-2013 4.480 63.72 94.77 14394
Panel E: 3–Month Fraction of Zero Returns
1926-2013 0.237 0.212 1.397 4.780
1926-1950 0.220 0.135 1.509 6.377
1951-1986 0.326 0.236 1.278 3.261
1987-1996 0.282 0.169 1.555 6.484
1997-2006 0.065 0.083 2.241 9.614
2007-2013 0.030 0.042 2.805 16.60
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post–Inauguration from February to April. Retit are the cumulative excess log re-
turns, over the value–weighted market portfolio, for the specified periods, and V OLit
is defined as the 3–month standard deviation of daily returns. The liquidity mea-
sures are specified as in equations 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4. In this baseline specification,
the explanatory variables are dummy variables that are equal to one prior to elec-
tions (1t(pre–Election)), after the elections (1t(post–Election)), after the inaugura-
tion (1t(post–Inauguration)) and zero otherwise. λt are year fixed effects and qt
are pre– and post–Election and post–Inauguration period fixed effects – similar to
quarter effects. Firm, year, and quarter fixed effects are included to account for all
the time–invariant differences between the stocks and across time. In addition the
inclusion of year and quarter fixed effects alters the interpretation of the β1 coeffi-
cient. If Election = Pre−Election, then β1 captures the y differential compared to
the non–election August–October period. In other words, the comparison is between
the August–October period (December–January, or February–April) of an election
year and the same period for all non election years. In the regressions excluding
the vector of other control variables, Xit, the coefficient β1 is the mean excess y
variable differential on pre– pr post–election periods versus the same periods in non
election years. Including the controls, the β1 coefficient captures the conditional
changes of the mean excess y variable differential. Standard errors are clustered by
time throughout the paper.10 In alternative specifications, we also include additional
control variables denoted by the vector Xit.
10We do not cluster by firm because it is unlikely that there is error autocorrelation that extends
beyond 4 months. Recall, that the comparison is between Novembers of election and non election
years, which would require a 12 month autocorrelation of the errors. In non tabulated regressions,
we use two–way clustering and the results remain qualitatively the same.
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Table 1.4 reports estimates for β1, pre– and post–Election and post–Inauguration,
excluding the vector of controls. As seen in the pre–Election result columns, during
the 3–month period prior to elections, from August to October, returns are higher
than non–election Aug–Oct periods, trading volume is lower and liquidity is worse
(both the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure and the fraction of zero returns in-
crease), and volatility decreases. Post–election, from November to January, however
liquidity improves (both the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure and the fraction of
zero returns decrease) and trading volume increases. Returns and volatility on the
other hand increase. We also include the post–Inauguration period (from February
to April), since this is the period that the new government takes office. During the
post–Inauguration period, returns and trading volume decrease, liquidity deterio-
rates significantly (the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure increases sharply and the
fraction of zero returns increases), and volatility increases.
The results from the baseline specification are consistent with the hypothesis
that the uncertainty associated with presidential elections is high prior to elections,
leading to higher cost of trading (higher returns, lower liquidity) prior to the elec-
tions. Post–Election, political uncertainty decreases, leading to improved liquidity
conditions. Post–Inauguration however, policy uncertainty is high leading to worse
liquidity conditions, lower returns, and higher volatility.
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Table 1.4: Baseline Return and Liquidity Regressions
This table reports the results of the following regression:
yit = µi + λt + qt + β11t(Election) + εit ,
where y ∈ {Retit, log(τit), ILLIQit, Zerosit} and Election is either a pre–Election, post–Election, or post–Inauguration
dummy. Retit are the cumulative excess log returns, over the value–weighted market portfolio, for the September–
November pre–election period and December–January post election period. log(τit), log(ILLIQit), and Zerosit are the
log turnover, the log Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, and the fraction of zero returns, as defined in eq. 1.2, 1.3,
and 1.4 respectively. In this specification, the explanatory variables are dummy variables that are equal to one prior
to elections (1t(pre–Election)) and after the elections (1t(post–Election)), and zero otherwise. Firm, year and quarter
fixed effects are included to account for all the time–invariant differences within the firms and across time. Standard
errors are clustered by time throughout the paper.
Ret Ret Ret log(τ) log(τ) log(τ)
Pre–Election 0.011∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗
Dummy [0.004] [0.022]
Post–Election 0.017∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
Dummy [0.004] [0.005]
Post–Inaugur. -0.025∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗
Dummy [0.006] [0.005]
ILLIQ ILLIQ ILLIQ Zeros Zeros Zeros Vol Vol Vol
Pre–Election 0.030 0.006∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
Dummy [0.179] [0.0003] [0.0006]
Post–Election -0.285 -0.004∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗
Dummy [0.208] [0.0004] [0.0004]
Post–Inaugur. 1.746∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗
Dummy [0.287] [0.0005] [0.001]
Obs 933,248 933,248 933,248 851,669 851,669 851,669
Obs 933,248 933,248 933,248 933,248 933,248 933,248 933,248 933,248 933,248
R2 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.26 0.23 0.23
R2 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.35 0.33 0.35 0.14 0.10 0.10
standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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1.5.2 Subsample Analysis – Uncertain elections
Having shown that market liquidity deteriorates in the months preceding the
presidential elections and improves in the months following the elections, we now
deepen our analysis by introducing variation in the degree of uncertainty across the
elections. If our main identification assumption holds, i.e., that political uncertainty
is higher on average in the months leading up to presidential elections and is resolved
when the outcome of the elections is declared, then the impact of political uncertainty
on market quality should be more profound during more uncertain elections.
To incorporate the degree of election uncertainty, we split the election sample
into two sub-samples; uncertain and non-uncertain elections. We define uncertain
elections based on the results of the final Gallup survey prior to each election. The
uncertain elections are the following six elections: 1952, 1960, 1968, 1976, 2004, and
2012. Table 1.2, column 6 and 7, show the popular vote margin across the U.S.
presidential elections and the final Gallup survey results. Both the methods identify
the same elections as uncertain elections, with the exception of the 1952 and 1992
elections.
Table 1.5 reports the results of the following regression:
yit = µi + λt + qt + β11t(Election) + β21t(Election)× 1t(UncertainElection)
+ β31t(UncertainElection) + εit , (1.6)
where 1t(UncertainElection) is equal to one when the election is uncertain and zero
otherwise. The interaction term (β2) picks up the differential effect of uncertain
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election on the level of y. The results, reported in table 1.5, are confirming our
main conjecture, i.e., that our baseline results are driven by political uncertainty.
During uncertain elections, the effects on liquidity, return, and volatility are more
pronounced both during the pre–election and the post–election period. In partic-
ular, in the pre–election period during uncertain elections turnover decreases and
price impact and the fraction of zero returns increase more as compared to all other
elections. Similarly, in the post–election period during uncertain elections, liquidity
improves and returns increase.
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Table 1.5: Election and Liquidity: Uncertain Elections
This table reports the results of the following regression:
yit = µi + λt + qt + β11t(Election) + β21t(Election)× 1t(UncertainElection) + β31t(UncertainElection) + εit ,
where y ∈ {Retit, log(τit), Zerosit, V olit} and Election is either a pre–Election or post–Election dummy.Retit are the cu-
mulative excess log returns, over the value–weighted market portfolio, for the September–November pre–election period
and December–January post election period. log(τit), log(ILLIQit), and Zerosit are the log turnover, the log Amihud
(2002) illiquidity measure, and the fraction of zero returns, as defined in eq. 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 respectively. In this spec-
ification, the explanatory variables are dummy variables that are equal to one prior to elections (1t(pre–Election)) and
after the elections (1t(post–Election)), and zero otherwise. In other words, the comparison is between the September–
October period (November–January or February–April) of an election year and the same period for all non election
years. Uncertain Election is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the presidential election is uncertain according to
the results of the final Gallup survey, i.e., when the difference is less than 2%. Firm, year, and quarter fixed effects are
included to account for all the time–invariant differences within the firms and across time. Standard errors are clustered
by time.
Ret Ret log(τ) log(τ) Zeros Zeros Vol Vol
Pre–Election 0.016∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗
Dummy [0.006] [0.011] [0.0004] [0.0004]
Uncertain Election × 0.012∗∗∗ -0.106∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
Pre–Election Dummy [0.002] [0.009] [0.0007] [0.0007]
Uncertain Election -0.036∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗
Dummy [0.004] [0.003] [0.0004] [0.00005]
Post–Election 0.001 0.038∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
Dummy [0.001] [0.014] [0.0004] [0.0001]
Uncertain Election × 0.061∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.001∗ -0.003∗∗∗
Post–Election Dummy [0.013] [0.005] [0.0006] [0.0002]
Uncertain Election -0.021∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
Dummy [0.008] [0.008] [0.0004] [0.0001]
Obs 933,248 933,248 851,669 851,669 933,248 933,248 933,248 933,248
standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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1.5.3 Subsample Analysis – Variation across Industries
Prior to U.S. presidential elections, when political uncertainty is high, liquidity
deteriorates, volatility decreases, and returns increase. These effects are more pro-
nounced during more uncertain elections and they revert in the following the elec-
tions. Since political uncertainty matters, its impact should depend on the degree
of a firm’s or industry’s sensitivity to changes in government policies. Accordingly,
we except to observe variation in the magnitude of liquidity, return, and volatility
changes across firms and industries.
We first exploit the variation across industries. We use the 12 industry portfolio
classification proposed by Kenneth French. For each n, where n denotes industry,
we run the baseline specification,
yit = µi + λt + qt + β11t(Election) + εit ,∀n ∈ {1, . . . , 12} . (1.7)
Table A.1 in the appendix shows the results. Pre–election, almost all industries ex-
perience a deterioration in liquidity, higher returns, and lower volatility. There also
seems to be an interesting correlation between returns and the Amihud (2002) illiq-
uidity measure. The industries, whose returns do no react prior to the elections, are
the only ones that have significantly higher price impact. Post–election, the results
are not as homogeneous. Industries that are considered more politically sensitive
(Energy, health, and money) react the most post–election. They are the only ones
that experience higher returns and improved liquidity. These results indicate that
industries that are more sensitive to government policy changes are affected the most
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Table 1.6: Politically Sensitive Industries: SIC Codes
This table reports the politically sensitive industries, their SIC codes, and the Fama-French 48
Industry codes.
Industry SIC Codes Fama-French
Tobacco 2100-2199 5
Guns and Defense 3760-3769 3795 26 26
3480-3489 26
Natural Resources 0800-0899
Mining 1000-1119
Utilities 4900 4910-4911 31 31
4920-4925 4930-4932 31 31
4939-4942 31
Alcohol 2080 2082-2085 4 4
both pre– and post–election.
To dig deeper, we refine our definition of political sensitivity and following Hong
and Kostovetsky (2012), we define as politically sensitive industries the following
industries: tobacco, alcohol, guns, defense, utilities, and natural resources (mining
and forestry). Table 1.6 shows the SIC codes for the industries and the Fama–French
48 industry code. The results are somewhat surprising. The politically sensitive
industries in the U.S have higher returns and fraction of zero returns both prior and
after the elections. They are also more liquid (lower Amihud (2002) illiquidity) both
prior and after the elections, suggesting that the higher returns may not be due to
illiquidity premium. A conclusion further reinforced by the fact that their trading
volume is not affected by elections.
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Table 1.7: Election and Liquidity: Politically Sensitive Industries
This table reports the results of the following regression:
yit = µi + λt + qt + β11t(Election) + β21t(Election)× 1t(PSI) + β31t(PSI) + εit ,
where y ∈ {Retit, log(τit), ILLIQit, Zerosit} and Election is either a pre–Election or post–Election dummy.Retit are
the cumulative excess log returns, over the value–weighted market portfolio, for the September–November pre–election
period and December–January post election period. log(τit), log(ILLIQit), and Zerosit are the log turnover, the
log Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, and the fraction of zero returns, as defined in eq. 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 respec-
tively. In this specification, the explanatory variables are dummy variables that are equal to one prior to elections
(1t(pre–Election)) and after the elections (1t(post–Election)), and zero otherwise. In other words, the comparison is
between the September–October period (November–January or February–April) of an election year and the same period
for all non election years. we define as politically sensitive industries the following industries: tobacco, alcohol, guns,
defense, utilities, and natural resources (mining and forestry). Table 1.6 shows the SIC codes for the industries and the
Fama–French 48 industry code. Firm, year, and quarter fixed effects are included to account for all the time–invariant
differences within the firms and across time. Standard errors are clustered by time.
Ret Ret log(τ) log(τ) ILLIQ ILLIQ Zeros Zeros
Pre–Election 0.01∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ 0.073 0.0056∗∗∗
Dummy [0.004] [0.015] [0.187] [0.0004]
PSI × 0.012∗∗∗ 0.016 -0.716∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
Pre–Election Dummy [0.002] [0.008] [0.265] [0.001]
PSI 0.003 0.015 1.094 -0.035∗∗
Dummy [0.003] [0.065] [0.752] [0.012]
Post–Election 0.018∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ -0.235 -0.004∗∗∗
Dummy [0.004] [0.011] [0.215] [0.0004]
PSI × 0.061∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.821∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗
Post–Election Dummy [0.013] [0.008] [0.262] [0.0012]
PSI 0.005 0.017 1.099 -0.035∗∗
Dummy [0.003] [0.065] [0.752] [0.012]
Obs 933,248 933,248 851,669 851,669 933,248 933,248 933,248 933,248
standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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1.5.4 Subsample Analysis – Variation across Parties
In the previous section we examined the effect of political uncertainty across
different industries and, in line with previous literature, we concluded that politi-
cally sensitive industries are more exposed to political uncertainty around the U.S.
presidential elections, i.e., the effects on returns, liquidity, and volatility are more
profound. In this section we exploit the variation across parties. An extended empir-
ical literature documents that firms and the overall economy perform substantially
differently under different ruling parties. In the macroeconomic literature, Chappell
and Keech (1986) show that under Democratic administrations, inflation rates are
on average higher by 2.5% than under Republican administrations. Alberto Alesina
(1988), on the other hand, document that, from 1948 to 1984, the first two years of a
Democratic administration are associated with higher annual rates of gross national
product (GNP) growth (5% vs. 1.2%) than the first two years of a Republican ad-
ministration. In the finance literature, Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) find that
returns are on average higher during Democratic administrations.
To exploit the variation across parties, we first create a dummy variable for the
incumbent party, 1t(Incumbent), which is equal to one if the incumbent party is the
Democratic party and zero if it is the Republican party. Column 3 in table 1.2 shows
the incumbent party for each election. We then estimate the following regression,
yit = µi + λt + qt + β11t(Election) + β21t(Election)× 1t(Incumbent)
+ β31t(Incumbent) + εit . (1.8)
30
Table 1.8 shows that results. First, it seems that the higher average returns prior
to elections are due to Democratic incumbent, an effect that dissipates after the
election. If the incumbent party is the Democratic party then liquidity, measured as
the Amihud (2002) illiquidity and the fraction of zero returns, is higher both prior
to elections and after the elections. Trading volume is also lower in both periods.
Overall these results show that, if the incumbent party is the Democratic party, the
financial markets are more liquid both pre– and post–election.
To further exploit the variation across parties, we create a dummy variable for
the winning party, 1t(Winning), which is equal to one if the incumbent party is the
Democratic party and zero if it is the Republican party. Column 5 in table 1.2 shows
the winning party for each election. Based on the previous results, if the winning
party is the Democratic party one would expect the liquidity to be further improved
compared to the Republican party. In addition, based on the results in the existing
literature, one would also expect the liquidity and returns to be higher during the
post–Inauguration period, since under the Democratic party policy uncertainty is
lower. To test these hypotheses, we estimate the following regression,
yit = µi + λt + qt + β11t(Election) + β21t(Election)× 1t(Winning)
+ β31t(Winning) + εit , (1.9)
where Election is either a post–Election or post–Inauguration dummy. The post–
Election from November to January, and the post–Inauguration from February to
April. Table 1.9 shows the estimates. In line with our previous results, when the
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winning party is the Democratic party, returns are higher and liquidity is further
improved in the post–election period. In fact, we find that returns are higher in the
post–election period only if the winning party is the Democratic party. During the
post–inauguration period however, we do not find a positive Democratic effect as
the results are mixed. That is, during the period that the winning Democratic party
takes office, returns are lower and the fraction of zero returns higher, but the trading
volume is also higher. In addition, returns are lower in the post–Inauguration period
only if the winning party is the Democratic party.
Our results in the previous section indicated that during the post–Inauguration
period, returns and trading volume decrease and liquidity deteriorates significantly
and we conjectured that this must be due to the increase in policy uncertainty. In
this section, we also found that this is the case only when the winning party is the
Democratic party. Nonetheless, if our policy uncertainty hypothesis is true then, if
the incumbent president wins the election, these results should be less significant,
regardless of the party. To test this hypothesis, we create a dummy variable that is
equal to one if the incumbent President wins the election and zero otherwise. Table
1.2 shows the winning and incumbent Presidents. Table 1.10 shows the results that
confirm our hypothesis. Indeed, if the incumbent President wins the election, liquid-
ity improves significantly. In fact, liquidity deteriorates only when a non–incumbent
President wins the election. This results supports our hypothesis that liquidity de-
teriorates due to policy uncertainty, which is lower if the incumbent President wins.
Returns are also significantly lower,which again may be due to decreasing policy
uncertainty.
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Table 1.8: Election and Liquidity: Incumbent Party
This table reports the results of the following regression:
yit = µi + λt + qt + β11t(Election) + β21t(Election)× 1t(Incumbent) + β31t(Incumbent) + εit ,
where y ∈ {Retit, log(τit), ILLIQit, Zerosit, V olit} and Election is either a pre–Election or post–Election dummy.Retit
are the cumulative excess log returns, over the value–weighted market portfolio, for the September–November pre–
election period and December–January post election period. log(τit), log(ILLIQit), and Zerosit are the log turnover,
the log Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, and the fraction of zero returns, as defined in eq. 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 respec-
tively. In this specification, the explanatory variables are dummy variables that are equal to one prior to elections
(1t(pre–Election)) and after the elections (1t(post–Election)), and zero otherwise. In other words, the comparison
is between the September–October period (November–January or February–April) of an election year and the same
period for all non election years. The dummy variable 1t(Incumbent) is equal to one if the incumbent party is the
Democratic party and zero if it is the Republican party. Column 3 in table 1.2 shows the incumbent parties for each
election. Firm, year, and quarter fixed effects are included to account for all the time–invariant differences within the
firms and across time. Standard errors are clustered by time.
Ret Ret log(τ) log(τ) ILLIQ ILLIQ Zeros Zeros
Pre–Election -0.002 -0.067∗∗∗ 0.262 0.0111∗∗∗
Dummy [0.002] [0.014] [0.246] [0.0004]
Incumbent × 0.038∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.628∗ -0.013∗∗∗
Pre–Election Dummy [0.007] [0.005] [0.320] [0.0007]
Incumbent -0.016∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ 0.111 0.001∗∗∗
Dummy [0.004] [0.003] [0.194] [0.0004]
Post–Election 0.037∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.074 -0.004∗∗∗
Dummy [0.012] [0.017] [0.254] [0.0004]
Incumbent × -0.049∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ -0.986∗∗ -0.002∗∗
Post–Election Dummy [0.015] [0.013] [0.328] [0.0006]
Incumbent -0.007∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ 0.207 0.002∗∗∗
Dummy [0.002] [0.008] [0.170] [0.0004]
Obs 933,248 933,248 851,669 851,669 933,248 933,248 933,248 933,248
standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 1.9: Election and Liquidity: Winning Party
This table reports the results of the following regression:
yit = µi + λt + qt + β11t(Election) + β21t(Election)× 1t(Winning) + β31t(Winning) + εit ,
where y ∈ {Retit, log(τit), ILLIQit, Zerosit} and Election is either a post–Election or post–Inauguration dummy.Retit
are the cumulative excess log returns, over the value–weighted market portfolio, for the September–November pre–
election period and December–January post election period. log(τit), log(ILLIQit), and Zerosit are the log turnover,
the log Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, and the fraction of zero returns, as defined in eq. 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 respec-
tively. In this specification, the explanatory variables are dummy variables that are equal to one after the elections
(1t(post–Election)) and after the inauguration of the new government,(1t(post–Inaugur.)), and zero otherwise. In
other words, the comparison is between the November–Januart period (or February–April) of an election year and
the same period for all non election years. The dummy variable 1t(Winning) is equal to one if the winning party is
the Democratic party and zero if it is the Republican party. Column 5 in table 1.2 shows the winning party for each
election. Firm, year, and quarter fixed effects are included to account for all the time–invariant differences within the
firms and across time. Standard errors are clustered by time.
Ret Ret log(τ) log(τ) ILLIQ ILLIQ Zeros Zeros
Post–Election 0.000 0.040∗∗ -0.026 -0.004∗∗∗
Dummy [0.002] [0.010] [0.246] [0.0005]
Winning × 0.043∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ -1.102∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
Post–Election Dummy [0.010] [0.013] [0.342] [0.0006]
Winning -0.028∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ 1.329∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗
Dummy [0.006] [0.011] [0.196] [0.0004]
Post–Inauguration -0.004 -0.032∗∗∗ 1.587∗∗∗ -0.0003
Dummy [0.002] [0.004] [0.469] [0.0004]
Winning × -0.050∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ -0.450 0.004∗∗∗
Post–Inaugur. Dummy [0.011] [0.006] [0.637] [0.0008]
Winning 0.006∗ -0.049∗∗∗ 0.580 0.004∗∗∗
Dummy [0.003] [0.005] [0.305] [0.0005]
Obs 933,248 933,248 851,669 851,669 933,248 933,248 933,248 933,248
standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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1.6 Empirical Tests of the hypotheses
So far we have shown that prior to U.S. presidential elections, financial market
liquidity worsens, returns increase, and volatility decreases. Once the uncertainty
regarding the outcome of the election has been resolved, liquidity improves, returns
continue to increase and volatility decreases. Confirming our hypothesis that these
effects are due to political uncertainty, which is higher in the months prior to the
elections and is resolved after the elections, we find that during uncertain elections
they are more pronounced. They are also more pronounced for industries that polit-
ically more sensitive. Next, we examine where does political uncertainty stem from.
As discussed in section 1.3, we conjecture that there are three potential channels,
namely, the asymmetric information, ambiguity, and disagreement.
One of the primary empirical implications of the disagreement hypothesis is that
trading volume and disagreement are positively correlated. In our setting that would
imply that trading volume increases prior to elections and decreases afterwards, a
result that we do not observe. In fact, we show that trading volume decreases prior
to elections and increases afterwards. Although this results is strong evidence against
the disagreement hypothesis, we conduct further tests of the hypothesis. To directly
test the disagreement hypothesis we proxy disagreement with the dispersion in the
analysts’ forecasts. Subsection 1.6.1.1 shows the results.
Testing directly the information asymmetry and ambiguity channels is quite chal-
lenging. First, our baseline empirical results are in line with both hypotheses. A
differentiating point is that information asymmetry predicts lower liquidity prior to
elections, whereas the ambiguity hypothesis predicts a decrease in liquidity. Our di-
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Table 1.10: Election and Liquidity: Incumbent Winning
This table reports the results of the following regression:
yit = µi+λt+qt+β11t(Post−Inaug.)+β21t(Election)×1t(Win.Incum.)+β31t(Win.Incum.)+εit ,
where y ∈ {Retit, log(τit), ILLIQit, Zerosit}.Retit are the cumulative excess log returns, over the
value–weighted market portfolio, for the September–November pre–election period and December–
January post election period. log(τit), log(ILLIQit), and Zerosit are the log turnover, the log
Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, and the fraction of zero returns, as defined in eq. 1.2, 1.3, and
1.4 respectively. In this specification, the explanatory variables are dummy variables that are equal
to one after the inauguration of the new government,(1t(post–Inaugur.)), and zero otherwise. In
other words, the comparison is between the February–April of an election year and the same period
for all non election years. The dummy variable 1t(Win.Incumb.) is equal to one if the incumbent
President wins the election and zero otherwise. Table 1.2 shows the winning party for each election
and whether there was an incumbent president. Firm, year, and quarter fixed effects are included
to account for all the time–invariant differences within the firms and across time. Standard errors
are clustered by time.
Ret log(τ) ILLIQ Zeros Vol
Post–Inauguration 0.0004 -0.022∗∗∗ 3.121∗∗∗ -0.0002 0.005∗∗∗
Dummy [0.002] [0.003] [0.474] [0.0005] [0.001]
Winning Incumb. × -0.056∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ -3.216∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
Post–Inaugur. Dummy [0.012] [0.006] [0.571] [0.0008] [0.0005]
Winning -0.006 -0.075∗∗∗ 0.039 0.007∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗
Dummy [0.002] [0.018] [0.248] [0.0005] [0.0003]
Obs 933,248 851,669 933,248 933,248 933,248
standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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rect measure of liquidity, the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, unfortunately is not
significant in the baseline specification. When we however, exploit the political sen-
sitivity of different industries and in particular, we explicitly define these industries
as in Hong and Kostovetsky (2012), the Amihud illiquidity measure decreases, indi-
cating that liquidity improves pre– and post–election for politically sensitive firms.
This results provides some evidence in favor of the ambiguity hypothesis.
1.6.1 Information Asymmetry and Disagreement Hypotheses Test
To shed more light on the asymmetric information and disagreement hypotheses,
and since ambiguity is elusive and difficult to measure, we next test indirectly these
two hypotheses. To proxy for information asymmetry we use two different types of
variables, i.e., analysts’ forecast error and working capital accruals.
The empirical literature on political uncertainty provides evidence of informa-
tion asymmetry. Lower investments and higher cash flows (Julio and Yook (2012)),
higher accounting conservatism (Dai and Ngo (2012)), and lower investment to price
sensitivity Durnev (2011) indicate that in the months prior to national elections the
adverse selection and moral hazard problems worsen thus, leading to higher informa-
tion asymmetry. In order to directly test the information asymmetry hypothesis we
employ working capital accruals (Calomiris and Himmelberg (1997), Levy (2010)) as
a proxy for information asymmetry.
We motivate this approach through existing literature that relates the working
capital accruals to information asymmetry. Working capital accruals are associated
with earnings management (Burgstahler and Dichev (1997)). The theoretical models
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of Dye (1988), and Trueman and Titman (1988) predict a positive relationship be-
tween earnings management and information asymmetry. The literature finds empir-
ical evidence for this relationship as well (Richardson (2000)). Thus, we hypothesize
that higher working capital accruals indicate potential earnings management which
in turn implies higher information asymmetry.
We recognize a potential endogeneity issue with this approach. During periods
of high political uncertainty, managers may be managing earnings in order to pro-
vide more conservative estimates rather than hide information from the market and
investors. If that is the case, increases in working capital accruals would indicate
an effort to better estimate future earnings rather than manipulation, i.e., adverse
selection and moral hazard. If managers increase working capital accruals in order
to be ‘on the safe’ side, they still provide less accurate information to the market
and investors, leading possibly to worsening liquidity.
To test this hypothesis, we estimate the following regression,
yit = µi + λt + qt + β11t(Q) + εit , (1.10)
where yit is either ∆(WC)it, the change in working capital, or the change in cash,
∆(Cash)it, another proxy for measuring earnings management. We measure ac-
cruals as the change in non–cash current assets (COMPUSTAT data item ACT less
COMPUSTAT data item CHE) less the change in current operating liabilities (COM-
PUSTAT data item LCT less COMPUSTAT data item DLC less COMPUSTAT data
item TXP). We obtain the quarterly data from Standard Standard and Poor’s Com-
pustat North America files; they extend from 1966 to 2012. The dummy variable
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1t(Q is equal to one during the 3rd quarter, the 4th quarter, or the 1st quarter of an
election year. The 3rd quarter is from July to September and in this specification is
considered the pre–election period. The 4th quarter, from October to December, of
an election year is considered the post election period. An important drawback in
the above specification is that the first quarter following an election begins in Oc-
tober, i.e., during a month that the uncertainty has not yet been resolved. Finally,
the 1st quarter refers to January–March post–election and it would the equivalent
of the post inauguration period.
Table 1.11 shows the results. We find that working capital accruals do change
significantly prior to the elections and after the elections. In particular, during the
3rd quarter, which is from July to September, accruals increase, implying that in-
deed information asymmetry increases. During the 4th quarter, from October to
December, they however do not change. This result is expected given that the 4th
quarter contains months both pre– and post–election. Finally, in the first quarter
after the elections accruals decrease, a result that confirms our hypothesis that infor-
mation asymmetry increases in the months prior to the elections and decrease after
the elections.
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Table 1.11: Information Asymmetry and Working Capital Accruals
This table reports the results of the following regression:
yit = µi + λt + qt + β11t(Q) + εit ,
where y ∈ {∆(WC)it,∆(Cash)it}. ∆(WC)it is the change in working capital and measured as
the change in non–cash current assets less the change in current operating liabilities. The data
begin in 1966 and extend to 2012. We thus, lose a significant portion of elections. The dummy
variable 1t(Q is equal to one during the 3rd quarter, the 4th quarter, or the 1st quarter of an
election year. The 3rd quarter is from July to September and in this specification is considered the
pre–election period. The 4th quarter, from October to December, of an election year is considered
the post election period. An important drawback in the above specification is that the first quarter
following an election begins in October, i.e., during a month that the uncertainty has not yet been
resolved. Finally, the 1st quarter refers to January–March post–election and it would the equivalent
of the post inauguration period. Firm, year, and quarter fixed effects are included to account for
all the time–invariant differences within the firms and across time. Standard errors are clustered
by time.
∆(WC) ∆(WC) ∆(WC) ∆(Cash) ∆(Cash) ∆(Cash)
Pre–Election, Q3 13.896
∗ -27.289
Dummy [6.222] [32.625]
Post–Election, Q4 -7.162 11.590
Dummy [7.953] [46.33]
Post–Inaugur., Q1 -
30.617∗∗∗
-72.49
Dummy [8.178] [67.74]
Obs 90,643 90,552 90,164 136,003 135,609 134,977
standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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1.6.1.1 Analysts’ Forecast Error
The literature on analysts’ forecasts has identified the analysts’ absolute forecast
error as proxies for information asymmetry (Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Levy
(2010)) and information heterogeneity (Pasquariello and Vega (2007) and Pasquar-
iello and Vega (2009)).11 In particular, Barron et al. (1998) develop a model that
relates the properties of the analysts’ forecasts to their information environment.
They show that forecast error has two components; the idiosyncratic and common
component. The idiosyncratic component is driven by the private information that
analysts rely on, whereas the common error arises from the errors in the public in-
formation. They find that the forecast dispersion reflects only the idiosyncratic error
while the absolute forecast error reflects primarily the common error. We thus use
the forecast dispersion as a proxy for differences in opinion and the absolute forecast
error as a proxy for information asymmetry.
Following the theoretical findings of Barron et al. (1998), we define the dispersion
in earnings forecasts as:
Dispersionit =
σ(Earnings Forecasts)it
Priceit
, (1.11)
and the absolute forecast error as:
|Forecast Errorit| = |Actual−Median Earnings Forecasts|it
Priceit
, (1.12)
11See also the work of Diether et al. (2002) and Scherbina (2004) who use the dispersion in the
analysts’ forecasts as a proxy for differences in opinion.
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where σ(Earnings Forecasts) is the standard deviation of the quarterly earnings fore-
casts, and Price is the quarter closing price. We obtain the data on earnings fore-
casts and the dispersion of analysts’ beliefs from Thomson and Reuters I/B/E/S
files, which extend from 1975 to 2012; thus, we miss two elections: 1968 and 1972.
We investigate the following regression specification:
yit = µi + λt + qt + β11t(Q) + εit ,it , (1.13)
where yit is either the dispersion of the analysts’ forecasts or the absolute forecast
error (definitions are in eq. 7 and 8), and 1t(Q) is a dummy variable for the quarters
preceding and following the presidential elections, as in eq. 1.10. Table 1.12 shows the
results of this regression specification. We find no statistically significant results. In
fact, we notice that both the measures experience a decrease rather than an increase
in the quarters preceding and an increase following the elections. Of course, we
cannot draw any conclusions from these effects as the coefficients are not significant;
that is, they are not estimated precisely.
These results lead us to reject the disagreement hypothesis.
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Table 1.12: Disagreement and Information Asymmetry: Analysts’ Forecasts
This table reports the results of the following regression:
yit = µi + λt + qt + β11t(Q) + εit ,
where y ∈ {Dispersionit, |Forecast Errorit|}. Dispersionit is the the dispersion in earnings forecasts as
defined in eq. 1.11 and |Forecast Errorit| is the absolute forecast error as defined in eq.1.12. We obtain
the data on earnings forecasts and the dispersion of analysts’ beliefs from Thomson and Reuters I/B/E/S
files, which extend from 1975 to 2012. The dummy variable 1t(Q is equal to one during the 3rd quarter,
the 4th quarter, or the 1st quarter of an election year. The 3rd quarter is from July to September and in
this specification is considered the pre–election period. The 4th quarter, from October to December, of an
election year is considered the post election period. An important drawback in the above specification is that
the first quarter following an election begins in October, i.e., during a month that the uncertainty has not
yet been resolved. Finally, the 1st quarter refers to January–March post–election and it would the equivalent
of the post inauguration period. Firm, year, and quarter fixed effects are included to account for all the
time–invariant differences within the firms and across time. Standard errors are clustered by time.
Dispersion Dispersion Dispersion |Forecast Error| |Forecast Error| |Forecast Error|
Pre–Election, Q3 0.000 -0.003
Dummy [0.011] [0.003]
Post–Election, Q4 -0.006 -0.034
Dummy [0.005] [0.052]
Post–Inaugur., Q1 0.008
∗∗∗ 0.789
Dummy [0.0009] [0.733]
Obs 59,370 73,295 60,584 74,251 55,237 69,006
standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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1.6.1.2 Subsample Analysis – Variation across Firm Characteristics
Our results so far indicate that the disagreement hypothesis is the weakest to
support. Between the information asymmetry and ambiguity hypothesis, we find
mixed support, although, in direct tests of the information asymmetry we indeed find
that information asymmetry increases prior to elections and decreases in the months
following the elections. In this section, as the last test of these two hypotheses, we
exploit the variation in firm characteristics. In particular we examine whether the
impact of political uncertainty varies across size and market beta portfolios.
We conjecture that if the ambiguity hypothesis is true, more ‘speculative ’, opaque
and harder–to–value firms will be affected more both pre– and post–election. That
is, these stocks will be the ones facing the highest uncertainty regarding the quality
of information available to investors. The characteristics do not necessarily affect
the quantity of information available.
We begin first by examining the effect of political uncertainty on firms of different
size. We separate the sample into deciles and estimate the baseline regression for
each size portfolio, i.e.,
ypit = µ
p
i + λ
p
t + qt + β
p
11t(Election) + ε
p
it ∀p ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 10} , (1.14)
where p = 1 contains the smallest firms and p = 20 the largest firms. Table B.1 of
the appendix shows the results. We observe that there is almost no variation across
different size portfolios. The sole difference is regarding the level of the turnover
change, which is higher for small firms. Both large and small firms are affected in
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exactly similar fashion by political uncertainty. The size variation results therefore,
fail to accept the ambiguity hypothesis.
The results in this section provide evidence in favor of the information asymmetry
hypothesis.
1.7 Conclusion
Our empirical analysis shows that political uncertainty has a significant impact on
financial market quality, i.e., returns, liquidity and volatility. In the months leading
up to presidential elections, liquidity deteriorates, returns increase, and volatility
decreases; we find that trading volume (measured by log turnover) decreases during
the months prior to the elections and increases in the months following the elections.
The fraction of zero returns increases and Amihud (2002) illiquidity decreases during
the period preceding the elections and reverse after the elections are over. We also
find that these results are more pronounced for politically sensitive firms and under
Republican administrations.
Such results can be explained by the increased information asymmetry, that is
the information quantity available to investors in the months preceding the elections
(information asymmetry hypothesis). Under the information asymmetry hypothesis,
we expect the asymmetry of the quantity of information available to investors to in-
crease with higher political uncertainty, i.e., prior to the presidential elections. After
the elections, once political uncertainty is resolved, the asymmetry decreases leading
to higher trading volume and liquidity. The information asymmetry hypothesis is
confirmed by our tests on working capital accruals, that increase prior to elections
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and decrease afterwards. The information asymmetry hypothesis is reinforced by our
cross-sectional results; the impact of political uncertainty does not vary across size
and market beta.
46
CHAPTER II
Liquidity Spillovers Across Asset Classes
[. . . ] the question isn’t whether there will be spillovers –
it’s how big they will be,
and where they will hit the hardest.
– Bloomberg, February 2015
2.1 Introduction
In recent financial crises the financial press and market participants have often
referred to liquidity spillovers, i.e., the transmissions of liquidity shocks from one
asset to another. A growing theoretical literature has also addressed the potential
channels and frictions that could generate liquidity spillovers. Yet despite the recur-
ring reference to liquidity spillovers, they remain poorly understood with very little
evidence of their existence. Do liquidity spillovers actually exist? What are their
properties? Are they more significant during periods of crisis? What are the trans-
mission channels that generate them? These are among the pertinent questions that
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remain unanswered. This paper addresses these questions by providing novel evi-
dence of liquidity spillovers across four different asset classes (Crude Oil, S&P500,
Eurodollar, and Ten–year Treasury Note) within the U.S. futures market. It also
investigates the empirical relevance of the transmission channels proposed by the
theoretical literature.1 The results of this paper indicate that (1) the liquidity and
price dynamics of one asset are significantly related to the liquidity of other assets,
in particular, during periods of financial turmoil, and (2) such dynamic relationships
are at least partly due to the funding ability of liquidity providers.
Understanding how liquidity spillovers develop has important asset pricing and
policy implications. First, a growing empirical literature provides evidence of priced
liquidity risk; therefore, disentangling the relevant transmission channels of liquidity
spillovers can shed light on how asset prices are affected by liquidity risk and com-
monality in liquidity.2 Second, central banks and financial institutions have come
to rely more on asset prices as a guide for policy and risk management, in partic-
ular during periods of financial turmoil. Consequently, determining the empirically
relevant price formation and liquidity processes has acquired an increasingly central
role for financial stability. For instance, knowing why liquidity dries up in many
otherwise unrelated markets – as was the case during the great recession – provides
an important policy tool on how to prevent or mitigate their impact.3
A number of transmission channels have been proposed to explain how liquidity
1e.g., Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Gromb and Vayanos (2012).
2Amihud (2002), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), and Acharya and Pedersen (2005), among oth-
ers, show that liquidity and commonality in liquidity are priced.
3Gromb and Vayanos (2012) mention that “the large losses banks incurred in the subprime
market has led them to cut their lending across the board, notably their financing of other inter-
mediaries, causing liquidity to dry up in many otherwise unrelated markets.”
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spillovers transpire. These channels can be broadly categorized into information–
based and liquidity supply–based channels. Information–based channels conjecture
that, in the presence of correlated or common fundamentals, shocks to one asset may
have price and liquidity implications for other assets via the cross–market rebalancing
activity of informed traders, who can be homogeneously or heterogeneously informed.
In particular, these traders respond to shocks in one market by optimally re–adjusting
their portfolios in other markets, effectively transmitting the shocks and generating
spillovers (Kodres and Pritsker (2002), Pasquariello (2007)). Liquidity supply–based
channels postulate that, in the presence of agents providing liquidity in multiple
assets, shocks to their funding needs or risk aversion may propagate across assets
(Kyle and Xiong (2001), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)). Both information
and liquidity supply–based theories predict higher liquidity spillovers during periods
of financial turmoil either because of higher adverse selection risk from order flow or
tighter traders’ financial constraints.
Measuring liquidity spillovers across assets and testing the proposed channels
posit a number of empirical challenges. First, spillovers are difficult to define.4 In line
with the aforementioned theoretical literature, this paper defines liquidity spillovers
from asset i to asset j as the lagged responses of asset j’s liquidity to changes in asset
i’s liquidity. It is important to note that models of price formation in multi–asset
markets generate contemporaneous, rather than lagged, responses to liquidity shocks.
Yet market frictions often omitted by these models (such as the slow incorporation
of information, slow moving capital, and slow resolution of uncertainty) make lagged
4An interesting but short discussion can be found in Bekaert and Harvey (2003).
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responses more plausible. Additionally, this definition and the subsequent empirical
specification exclude liquidity responses that are more likely to be due to common
shocks.
Secondly, any attempt to assess the intensity of liquidity spillovers requires mea-
suring market liquidity, a fundamental, albeit elusive, concept. Liquidity is most
often described as the ability to buy or sell any quantity of an asset quickly and with
minimal or no price impact. Motivated by the aforementioned theoretical literature
on liquidity transmission channels, this paper concentrates on the price impact, or
market depth, dimension of liquidity, which is estimated with a modified Amihud
(2002) measure – a standard proxy for market depth in the literature.
Thirdly, when comparing liquidity across different assets, one has to account for
their intrinsic characteristics (asset size, payoff schedule, etc.), different regulatory
and market environments (over the counter, exchange traded, trading rules and plat-
forms), and barriers to entry (funds and knowledge). Accordingly, any comparison
of liquidity across assets must allow for the possibility of heterogeneous market mi-
crostructure across markets. To overcome these challenges, I use data from the U.S.
futures market. Contracts in the U.S. futures market are exchanged in the same
trading environment and under the same market microstructure. The U.S. futures
market is also among the most liquid markets and often, more liquid that the re-
spective cash market. In addition, data are reported accurately and systematically,
akin to the U.S. stock market data.
I measure liquidity spillovers across the futures market over time by estimat-
ing a reduced–form vector autoregression (VAR), using daily data from the Chicago
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Mercantile Exchange (CME) on the Crude Oil, S&P500, Eurodollar, and Ten–year
Treasury Note contracts between 1986 and 2015. The VAR system uses daily re-
turn, volatility, and liquidity series and is estimated over 1–year rolling windows of
daily data. This reduced-form VAR allows one to capture the dynamic interactions
of liquidity, return, and volatility across the four contracts without any structural
restrictions. Within this framework, I measure the intensity of liquidity spillovers
from asset i to asset j as the improvement of fit from allowing for lagged liquidity
shocks in asset i to affect liquidity in asset j.
I find significant liquidity spillovers across the four assets that increase substan-
tially during periods of financial and macroeconomic turmoil. Liquidity spillovers to
Crude Oil and Eurodollar, for instance, increased by three standard deviations during
the 2007–2008 financial crisis. During the Asian crisis of 1997, liquidity spillovers to
S&P500 increased by 2.5 standard deviations. To delve further into the time–series
properties of spillovers, I use a Markov switching model to show that the spillover
series are governed by higher mean and variance during major financial and macroe-
conomic events. These results contribute to an existing empirical literature that finds
little direct evidence of liquidity spillovers across assets.5
What are the empirically relevant transmission channels that generate liquidity
spillovers? To test these channels I use monthly data on theoretically motivated state
variables for each channel and estimate time–series regressions using the monthly
5Chordia et al. (2005) use intra–day data on US equity and 10yr. Treasury bonds to explore
cross–market liquidity dynamics, but find “no evidence of a causal” (in the Granger–causality
sense) “relationship between stock and bond spreads [. . . ]”. Goyenko and Ukhov (2009) extend
the Chordia et. al (2005a) sample by adding bonds of different maturities, and find evidence of
“illiquidity integration between stock and bond markets”.
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average liquidity spillovers across assets. For the information based channels, I use
monthly changes in unemployment, personal consumption expenditures, and the
Chicago Fed’s monthly index of U.S. real activity (CFNAI) as possible macroeco-
nomic fundamentals. I choose these macroeconomic series because they are closely
monitored by market participants. To measure information heterogeneity, I create
a monthly forecast dispersion index using the commonality between Michigan’s con-
sumer confidence index and the dispersion of forecasts from the Survey of Professional
Forecasters on a number of macroeconomic variables. For the liquidity supply–based
channels, I proxy for risk aversion with the difference between implied volatility and
realized volatility, as in Bollerslev et al. (2009). Finally, I measure traders’ funding
constraints via the monthly returns of the leverage factor mimicking portfolio of the
Adrian et al. (2014) leverage factor.
The time–series regressions provide strong evidence in support of the liquidity
supply based transmission channels. In particular, I find that lower returns on the
leverage factor mimicking portfolio predict higher average liquidity spillovers. This
result is in line with the Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) liquidity transmission
channel which predicts that decreasing leverage (i.e., lower returns on the mimicking
portfolio) predicts tightening funding constraints and thus, higher liquidity spillovers
across assets. These results are robust to alternative definitions of liquidity spillover
intensity and estimation windows.
The paper is organized as follows.Section 2.2 describes the data and discusses the
VAR specification. Section 2.3 shows the main results on the time series of liquidity
spillovers and the Markov switching model. Section 2.4 discusses the theoretical
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motivation of this investigation. Section 2.5 presents the state variables relevant to
the theoretical transmission channels and the results of the time–series regressions.
Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Data, Liquidity Measures, and VAR specification
2.2.1 Data
This study uses end–of–day (EOD) Futures Data from the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange (CME) on the Crude Oil, S&P 500, Eurodollar, and the 10 year T–Note
contracts. The EOD data contain all of the official closing information for CME
Group contracts, including open and close price, high and low price, open interest,
total volume, volume breakdown by venue, and settlement price. Because the con-
tracts have different starting dates, I use July, 1986, as the earliest common one.
Table 2.1 shows the contract specifications for each of the four contracts. The con-
tracts share many similarities on contract cycles, minimum tick size, and trading
hours. They however, have different termination dates and notional amounts.
To account for those differences I use the following methodology. For each con-
tract, I only keep the March quarterly cycle contracts (Mar–Jun–Sep–Dec). This
allows to construct four different time–series (for any measure) by starting with a
contract having x ∈ {3, 6, 9, 12} months to maturity and rolling over at the termi-
nation day of March, June, September, and December into successive contracts with
the same original time to maturity. The S&P 500 contract, for instance, typically
terminates eight days prior to last trade date for open outcry (3:15p.m. on Thurs-
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Table 2.1: Contract Specifications
This table presents the futures contracts specifications for Crude Oil, S&P500, Eurodollar, and the
10yr. Treasury Note.
Unit Contract Price Minimum Tick
Size Tick Value
Crude Oil 1,000 barrels USD $0.01/barrel $10
S&P 500 $250×S&P 500 Index Index Points 0.05 index points $12.50
Eurodollar $1 million IMM pointsb 0.0025 price points $6.25c
3–month LIBOR
10 yr T–Note $100,000 FV Points ($1000) 1/2 of 1/32 $15.625f
and 1/2 of 1/32e
Unit Termination Listed Normal
of Trading Contracts Trading Hours (CST)
Crude Oil (1) Monthly 5:00 p.m. – 4:15 p.m. (Sun-Fri)
S&P 500 (2) March Cyclea 5:00 p.m. – 4:15 p.m. (Mon-Fri)
Eurodollar (3) March Cycled 5:00 p.m. – 4:00 p.m. (Sun-Fri)
10 yr T–Note (4) March Cycle 5:00 p.m. – 4:00 p.m. (Sun-Fri)
(1) Trading in the current delivery month shall cease on the 3rd business day prior to the 25th
calendar day of the month preceding the delivery month
(2) On the rollover date; typically 8 days prior to last trade date for open outcry (3:15p.m. on
Thursday prior to 3rd Friday of the contract month).
(3) 2nd London bank business day before 3rd Wednesday of the contract month.
(4) 7th business day preceding the last business day of the delivery month.
a March Cycle is March–June–September–December.
b 100 points – the 3-month LIBOR for spot settlement on the 3rd Wednesday of contract month.
E.g., a price quote of 97.45 signifies a deposit rate of 2.55% p.a.
c For the nearest expiring contract month. All other contract months: 0.005 price points = $12.50/
contract.
d Plus the nearest 4 “serial” months not in the March Quarter Cycle.
e For example, 126-16 represents 126 16/32 and 126-165 represents 126 16.5/32. Par is on the basis
of 100 points.
f Except for inter–month spreads, where the minimum price fluctuation shall be one-quarter of one
thirty-second of one point ($7.8125 per contract).
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day prior to 3rd Friday of the contract month). That is, the March, 2014 S&P 500
terminated on Wednesday, March 12th, since the 3rd Friday of March, 2014 was on
March 21st. On Wednesday, March 12th 2014, I rollover to the June contract for
the 3–months to maturity, to the September contract for the 6–months to maturity,
and to the December contract for the 9–months to maturity. I focus only on the
3–month, 6–month, and 9–month maturities because the 12–month maturity is not
actively traded. To preserve space, I present results from the tests on three month
contracts.
I delete all observations with settlement price zero or missing and total trading
volume (from all venues) missing. I also, standardize all settlement prices to a 100
basis.
2.2.2 Liquidity Measures
Liquidity is a multifaceted concept that is difficult to define and measure as
desired. Motivated by the theories discussed in section (2.4), this paper concentrates
on the price impact (Kyle’s λ) dimension of liquidity which, unless one observes
transaction initiated data, is unobservable and thus must be estimated.
I proxy for price impact using a modified daily Amihud (2002) measure. It can
be interpreted as the daily price response associated with one contract of trading
volume, thus serving as a rough measure of price impact. According to this measure,
an asset is illiquid if its price moves a lot in response to little volume. The Amihud
(2002) measure is intuitive and simple to compute. Hasbrouck (2002) shows that
“among the [liquidity] proxies . . . , the illiquidity measure appears to be the best” at
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capturing Kyle’s λ.
Amihud (2002) defines the illiquidity of asset j in day t as following,
ILLIQj,t =
|rj,t|
DVj,t
, (2.1)
where rj,t and DVj,t are, respectively, the return and dollar volume of asset j on
day t. I modify the Amihud (2002) measure by substituting the dollar volume with
volume, i.e.,
AMj,t =
|rj,t|
Vj,t
, (2.2)
where Vj,t is the trading volume of asset j on day t. To correct the Amihud (2002)
measure scale, it is customary to multiply it by 104. I use the modified Amihud
(2002) measure for two reasons. First, dollar volume is not meaningful for futures
because there is no dollar investment required. I.e., in contrast to the cash market
where each trade is accompanied by a cash transaction, in the futures market there
is no cash transfer when a trader buys or sells a contract. Additionally, the modified
Amihud (2002) measure is not affected by price levels.
To calculate daily volatility, I utilize high and low daily prices as following,
V olj,t =
√
(logHj,t − logLj,t)2
4 log 2
, (2.3)
where Hj,t is the high settlement price of asset j on day t and Lj,t the low price.
Parkinson (1980) first suggested this measure as a more efficient and, under certain
conditions, unbiased estimator of daily realized variance. Martens and Van Dijk
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(2007) have a more detailed discussion.
Finally, daily returns are daily percentage changes of settlement prices. I.e.,
Retj,t = (Pj,t − Pj,t−1)/Pj,t−1. (2.4)
To correct for outliers, I winsorize the data at the bottom and top 1% for each
variable.
Figure 2.1 shows the raw Amihud series for the 3–month maturity contract of each
asset (monthly averages to improve the readability of the plot). According to the
Amihud measure, the Eurodollar is the most liquid asset among the four considered.
The liquidity of both the S&P500 and T–Note decreased significantly during the
great recession. Only for the latter however, has liquidity returned to the pre–crisis
levels of 2009. The liquidity of Crude Oil has been improving steadily and seems to
have been unaffected by the great recession.
Figure 2.1 suggests that Amihud’s liquidity measure is persistent and trending,
and displays seasonal patterns. The autocorrelation of the modified Amihud (2002)
measure, for instance, ranges from 0.62 to 0.85 at the daily frequency for the different
contracts. The seasonality stems from the fact that as a contract nears its expiration
date, trading volume increases (as traders often close their positions before contracts
expire) and the settlement prices converge rapidly towards the price of the underlying
asset. To account for these regularities, I first assume a first–order deterministic
trend, i.e.,
AMj,t = δt+ uj,t, ∀ j, (2.5)
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Figure 2.1: The raw modified Amihud (2002) measure is computed as shown in equa-
tion 2.2. To improve the readability of the plot, the raw Amihud measure
is averaged to the monthly frequency.
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and henceforth use the residuals, uˆj,t, as the detrended liquidity measures. I correct
for the linear trend in order to account for technological changes and other advances
that may have affected the futures contracts in different times and ways. To account
for the seasonality and persistence, I then control for the number of days until the
expiration of the contract and focus on innovations from the following ARMA(1,1)
model, i.e.,
uj,t = α0 + α1uj,t−1 + θ1εj,t−1 + α2RDj,t + εj,t, (2.6)
where RDj,t are the remaining days in the contract before it expires. I define the
residuals, εj,t, as the adjusted Amihud illiquidity, which, for ease of exposition, I will
denote by LIQj,t. The adjusted modified Amihud measure is an illiquidity measure;
an increase in LIQ implies a higher price impact and thus, lower liquidity.
Volatility is also highly persistent (ranging between 0.75 and 0.90), I thus use its
AR(1) innovations as modified volatility series.
Figure 2.2 plots the adjusted Amihud series (again, monthly averages to improve
the readability of the plot). The figures suggest that the trend and persistency are,
in part, corrected.
2.2.3 Reduced–form VAR
I propose a reduced–form 12–dimensional VAR(4) model based on daily data for
yt = (V olj,t, Retj,t, LIQj,t)
′. The reduced–form 12–dimensional VAR(4) is
yt = α +
4∑
i=1
Φiyt−i + et, (2.7)
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Figure 2.2: The adjusted Amihud series are the innovations of the ARMA(1,1) model
of eq. (2.6). To improve the readability of the plot, the adjusted Amihud
measure is averaged to the monthly frequency.
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where yt, α, and et are (12× 1) vectors and Φi (12× 12) matrices.
I include returns and price volatility because earlier literature has identified re-
turns and volatility as the main drivers of liquidity measures.6 Chordia et al. (2001),
in particular, have clarified the significant role of volatility and returns in causing
dynamic shifts in liquidity. The lag order of 4 days is chosen based on the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC).
The reduced–form VAR is consistently estimated by least squares. To investigate
liquidity linkages across asset classes, I first perform pairwise Granger–causality tests
between the endogenous variables of the VAR. Table 2.2 shows the baseline Granger
Causality results, on the whole sample starting from July, 1986 to April 2015. To test
the null hypothesis that (column) variable i does not Granger cause (row) variable
j, I test whether the lag coefficients of i are jointly zero when j is the independent
variable in the VAR, i.e., Wald test. The coefficients in Table 2.2 are the summed
lag coefficients of variable i. Test statistics are in parentheses and critical values
are from asymptotic χ2–distribution with p = 4 degrees of freedom. The liquidity
dynamics are shown in bold, in the lower right corner.
6e.g., Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), Chordia et al. (2011)
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Table 2.2: Baseline VAR – Granger Causality Tests
The table presents the baseline VAR results with endogenous variables (3 time–series for each variable) the Amihud
measure (LIQ), returns (RET ), and volatility (V OL). The number of lags is p = 4. The coefficients are the sum of
the respective lag coefficients. The columns are the time t variables, so, column LIQCL shows the cumulative effect of
changes on the Crude Oil liquidity to the other endogenous variables. I conduct a Wald test to test the null hypothesis
of Granger–non causality, test statistics are in parentheses. The asymptotic χ2 with p = 4 DF, critical values for the
1% level is 13.277, 5% level is 9.488, and 10% is 7.779.
RETCL RETTY FRETSP RETED V OLCL V OLTY FV OLSP V OLED LIQCL LIQTY F LIQSP LIQED
RETCL 0.021 0.057 -1.604 -6.09
c 5.367 -28.03 129.3 0.118c 0.091 -0.329 -8.423
(3.47) (4.71) (3.95) (17.8) (2.60) (7.80) (4.55) (13.5) (4.86) (6.12) (4.24)
RETTY F 0.008 -0.005 1.040 -2.109 1.264 -1.10
c -34.77 0.018 -0.052 0.048 0.468
(2.24) (10.7) (0.99) (1.86) (10.5) (20.9) (5.76) (0.85) (7.15) (3.67) (0.69)
RETSP -.002
c 0.054 -.047a -1.15c 3.762 10.64c -141c 0.018b -0.010 0.137c 1.938
(13.8) (1.26) (7.87) (27.5) (1.70) (308) (22.0) (10.9) (7.17) (57.1) (3.87)
RETED 0.00 0.003
c -.002a 0.076 -0.243 0.787 12.97b 0.003a 0.00c -0.002 0.192
(6.86) (57.9) (9.19) (2.18) (1.61) (0.79) (12.5) (9.05) (15.8) (5.68) (1.79)
V OLCL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.003 0.204
c 0.621c -2.24c 0.00c 0.00 -0.002 0.193
(3.70) (3.31) (1.05) (1.01) (26.2) (71.3) (14.2) (21.7) (7.47) (4.80) (4.19)
V OLTY F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.037
c 0.118 0.600b 0.00 0.00b -.002a 0.004
(3.00) (5.60) (0.61) (0.99) (14.3) (9.27) (38.6) (6.59) (11.5) (9.33) (0.92)
V OLSP 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.001 0.108
c 0.061c 1.344c 0.00c 0.00c 0.00c 0.018
(4.84) (4.52) (4.49) (6.65) (118) (44.2) (24.8) (15.0) (10.4) (19.0) (3.46)
V OLED 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
a 0.00c -.009a 0.009b 0.00a 0.00 0.00c 0.001c
(1.38) (5.56) (1.87) (8.51) (21.8) (7.89) (12.6) (9.35) (6.12) (19.6) (27.1)
LIQCL -0.020 -0.011 0.003 0.521 4.104
c 7.410 3.267 -161b -.083c 0.054 1.913a
(6.29) (1.9) (4.57) (5.41) (19.6) (5.34) (4.09) (12.5) (22.1) (3.34) (8.37)
LIQTY F -0.002 0.011
a 0.005 -.570c -1.910 -15.12 7.360 21.85b -.056c -.064 8.984c
(1.25) (8.97) (6.81) (31.6) (0.99) (7.50) (2.56) (10.1) (13.9) (3.13) (50.2)
LIQSP -0.005 0.021 -0.029 0.018 1.420
a -0.358 -4.02a 99.57b -.003b -.003 3.104c
(6.38) (5.22) (5.94) (3.97) (8.40) (0.77) (8.49) (10.2) (9.47) (3.77) (49.1)
LIQED 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.002
b -0.034 0.081 0.054 -2.78c 0.00c 0.00c 0.006c
(4.47) (2.30) (2.97) (11.4) (2.17) (3.39) (6.30) (38.4) (15.1) (98.1) (31.0)
a p < 0.05, b p < 0.01, c p < 0.001
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Negative liquidity shocks to the ED (LIQED) contract predict subsequent de-
crease in liquidity in all three contracts. This result may be justified by the fact that
the ED contract is by far the most liquid market. The liquidity of ED is also af-
fected by the liquidity shocks to all three contracts. Liquidity shocks of SP spillover
only to ED. In other words, SP generates the fewer spillovers to and from other
contracts. Finally, there is a strong bi–directional liquidity spillover link between
the CL and the TYF contracts; negative liquidity shocks to TYF predict improved
liquidity conditions in CL, and vice versa.
Overall, these preliminary results suggest that short–maturity interest rate mar-
kets’ liquidity conditions are significant leading indicators of general liquidity con-
ditions. The flight–to–liquidity effect between the equity market and the Treasury
bond is not evident in my sample. There is however, flight–to–liquidity effect between
the 10yr T–Note and Crude Oil.
Using a non–structural approach and eliminating microstructure concerns, I find
direct and significant liquidity spillovers across the four assets. These results add to
the existing empirical literature that finds little direct evidence of spillovers. Chordia
et al. (2005), for instance, use intra–day data on US equity and 10yr. Treasury bonds
to explore cross–market liquidity dynamics, but find no evidence of cross-market
causations. As they mention, “there is no evidence of a causal” (in the Granger–
causality sense) “relationship between stock and bond spreads or between spreads
in one market and volatility in the other.” Goyenko and Ukhov (2009) extend the
Chordia et al. (2005) sample by adding bonds of different maturities, and find that
“illiquidity of one market has a predictive power for illiquidity of the other market”.
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Their results however pertain to short–maturity bonds.
2.3 Dynamic Liquidity Spillovers
The baseline results provide preliminary evidence of direct liquidity spillovers
across assets. To gain further insight on the time dynamics of such spillovers, I
propose a 1–year rolling over reduced–form VAR. The choice of 1 years allows for
a large enough sample to consistently estimate the model and concurrently, capture
spillovers on as high a possible frequency.
I define liquidity spillovers for each pair of assets as the mean squared error
(MSE) ratio of a restricted VAR over an unrestricted VAR. The unrestricted VAR
is the one on eq. (2.7), 12–dimensional VAR(4) on yt = (V olj,t, Retj,t, LIQj,t)
′. For
each liquidity spillover pair, the restricted VAR is the 12–dimensional VAR(4) with
Granger non–causality type exclusion restrictions.
More specifically, to measure liquidity spillovers from asset i to asset j, I restrict
in asset j’s liquidity equation, the lagged coefficients of asset i’s liquidity, return,
and volatility to zero. The mean squared error of the restricted VAR(4) is then the
variance (from the variance–covariance matrix) that corresponds to asset j’s liquidity
equation. Similarly, the unrestricted VAR(4) mean squared error is the variance that
corresponds to the asset j’s liquidity equation from the variance–covariance matrix
of the unrestricted 12–dimensional reduced form VAR(4). I restrict the coefficients
in return and volatility equations to control for indirect spillovers because results in
the baseline VAR, table 2.2, show that there are indirect liquidity spillovers through
shocks to returns and volatility.
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Because the lag order is p = 4, there are (4× 3 = 12) linear restrictions and the
restricted VAR can be estimated by estimated GLS (see Appendix (??) for proofs
and details). Pairwise liquidity spillovers are defined as the ratio of the MSE (for
the liquidity of interest) of the unrestricted VAR and the restricted VAR. I.e., the
liquidity spillover from asset i to asset j at time t is
LSPILLij,t =
MSErj,t
MSEunrj,i,t
, (2.8)
where MSEunrj,t is the jth (liquidity) diagonal element of the innovation covariance
matrix from the unrestricted VAR and MSErj,i,t is the jth (liquidity) diagonal el-
ement of the innovation covariance matrix from the restricted VAR, with the lag
coefficients of the liquidity of the i asset set to zero. High [low] values of the MSE
reduction mean higher [lower] absolute liquidity spillovers. In particular, an increase
in the value of LSPILLij,t means that when restricting the VAR, i.e., when shutting
down the liquidity spillover, the increase in MSErj,t is greater than the increase in
MSEunrj,i,t , and thus the restriction is blocking a meaningful liquidity channel. This
measure, since it is a variance ratio, excludes responses to common shocks from being
identified as liquidity spillovers. That is, in the case of common shocks, both the
MSErj,t and the MSE
unr
j,i,t are affected in the same way and thus, the total common
shock effect drops out. Finally, defining liquidity spillovers as a ratio allows to control
for heteroscedasticity, i.e., changes in the variance over time.
This measure of liquidity spillover, is in line with the theories discussed in section
(2.4) and captures the absolute magnitudes of liquidity spillovers and not the signs.
In addition, by concentrating on the MSE one uses the errors which are stationary
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and hence the measure of liquidity spillovers is stationary. If one were to use the
coefficients then the measure of liquidity spillovers would not have been stationary.
The rolling over VAR is estimated using 1-year period. In each iteration, I add one
day and subtract the oldest day in the sample.7
2.3.1 Summary of Results
Figure 2.3 plots the average liquidity spillovers to each asset. To improve the
readability of the plot, the daily spillovers have been averaged to the monthly fre-
quency and standardized to have zero mean and unit variance for convenience. That
is, “liquidity spillovers to CL” plots the (equally weighted) average liquidity spillovers
from TYF, SP, and ED to CL. Quite interestingly, liquidity spillovers to CL do not
exhibit significant time variation pre–2007, after which point they spike and are sig-
nificant. During the great recession and the European sovereign crisis, spillovers to
CL have increased by almost 3 standard deviations. These results support the idea of
financialization of commodity markets, i.e., the large inflow of investment capital to
commodity futures markets, that has turned commodities into popular asset class for
portfolio investors, just like stocks and bonds.8 This financialization has affected the
liquidity of Crude Oil in a manner potentially consistent with my results. A similar
pattern of liquidity spillovers is observed for the Eurodollar contract. What is also
interesting is that liquidity spillovers to the S&P500 contract have decreased sub-
stantially post–2007 (by one standard deviation), although they were very significant
7Despite the decrease in the sub–samples length the estimated process remains stable, as deter-
mined by the roots of the polynomial det(I12 − Φˆ1y − Φˆ2y2 − Φˆ3y3 − Φˆ4y4).
8An interesting and more thorough discussion on the financialization of commodities can be
found in Cheng and Xiong (2013).
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in the prior years. During the Asian crisis, for instance, spillovers to SP increased by
2.5 standard deviations. Finally, the 10yr. T–Note, contrary to the other contracts,
seems to serve as a flight–to–quality asset during some financial crises (Russian de-
fault, LTCM, Great Recession) during which liquidity spillovers drop significantly,
as opposed to other major crises.
Figure 2.4 plots the time evolution of the (equally–weighted) average liquidity
spillovers (again the daily spillovers have been averaged to the monthly frequency
and standardized to have zero mean and unit variance for convenience). The measure
increases during major events (1997 Asian crisis and 1998 Russian default and LTCM
collapse, 2003 Iraq War, 2007 great recession, European sovereign crisis).
These results conform to the intuition of the theories discussed in section (2.4).
Liquidity spillovers are expected to spike during periods of higher fundamental un-
certainty, information heterogeneity, risk aversion, and financial constraints. These
periods coincide with periods of financial turmoil, i.e., the periods during which the
liquidity spillover measure spikes. I next use a Markov switching model to examine
more thoroughly the time series properties of liquidity spillovers.
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Figure 2.3: Each liquidity spillover pair is defined as in eq. (2.8). The figure plots
the equally weighted average of liquidity spillovers across the three assets
to one asset. That is, spillovers to CL show the average spillovers from
TYF, SP, and ED to CL. To improve the readability of the plot, the daily
spillovers have been averaged to the monthly frequency. I standardize
each series to have zero mean and unit variance for convenience.
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Figure 2.4: Each liquidity spillover pair is defined as in eq. (2.8). The figure plots the equally weighted average
of liquidity spillovers across the 12 spillover pairs. The average is computed after each spillover
pair is standardized to zero mean and unit variance. Daily spillovers have been averaged to the
monthly frequency. The shaded areas represent periods of major financial and macroeconomics
events.
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2.3.2 Markov Switching Model
The pairwise liquidity spillovers seem to exhibit breaks in their behavior. One
way to assess this behavior is to study the time–series properties of the conditional
moments (mean, variance) of the liquidity spillovers via a regime switching model.
That is, if indeed the liquidity spillover series follow a different process during peri-
ods that are characterized by major financial and macroeconomic events (regime 1)
than during non–turmoil periods (regime 2), then the conditional moments of such
spillovers must also be different in the two regimes. A convenient way to model this
type of regime-switching behavior is in terms of an unobserved discrete state variable
(regime 1 and regime 2) that is driven by a Markov chain.
I postulate that the average liquidity spillover is driven by the following process:
LSPILLi,t = µi,st + εi,st , (2.9)
where LSPILLi,t is the (monthly) average liquidity spillover to asset i from the other
three assets at time t, st ∈ {1, 2}, and εt ∼ N(0, σ2st). In other words, in each regime,
the average liquidity spillover has the following representation,
LSPILLi,t =

µi,1 + u1t, if st = 1
µi,1 + u2t, if st = 2,
(2.10)
where uit ∼ N(0, σ2i ). The state variable st determines whether it is regime 1 or
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regime 2 and the Markov switching probability for state transition is specified as
P{st = k|st−1 = l, st−2 = n, . . . ,Ft−1} = P{st = k|st−1 = l} = plk, (2.11)
where plk denotes the probability of state k following state l. The transition matrix
therefore, is
P =
p11 p12
p21 p22
 .
The estimation uses the Hamilton (1989) filter and the Expectation Maximization
(EM) algorithm. Since the filter is fairly common, I will not provide the proofs; a
lengthy discussion can be found in Dempster et al. (1977), Hamilton (1989), and
Krolzig (2013).9
The Markov switching model of eq. (2.9) confirms there are indeed two states,
one characterized by low conditional mean and variance (regime 1) and one by high
conditional mean and variance (regime 2), with the exception of liquidity spillovers
to the SP contract, that are more volatile in the low mean state. Table 2.3 shows the
Markov switching model results. Regime 1 lasts longer than regime 2, as theories
suggest (panel A). The transition matrix provides information regarding the non–
linear persistence outside the usual autoregressive parameters. In particular, both
regimes are very persistent. p11, the probability that if the process is in regime 1 it
will remain in regime 1, is 98% and p22 is 95%. Figure 2.5 plots the monthly equally
weighted average liquidity spillovers, the conditional variance (σ2st), the conditional
mean (µst), and the probabilities of each state occurring at each time. Similar to the
9The model is estimated using MATLAB R© and minor changes on Perlin’s code.
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Table 2.3: Two–state Markov Switching Model
The table presents the parameters estimated by the Markov Switching model,
LSPILLi,t = µi,st + i,st ,
where LSPILLi,t is the (monthly) average liquidity spillover to asset i from the other
three assets at time t, st ∈ {1, 2}, and t ∼ N(0, σ2st).
Panel A
Transition Matrix Expected Duration of Periods
0.98∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ Regime 1 439.31 days
0.02∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ Regime 2 110.61 days
Panel B – Switching Parameters
ED CL TYF SP
µ1 1.3× 104∗∗∗ 1.644∗∗∗ 3.782∗∗∗ 4.923∗∗∗
µ2 4.5× 104∗∗∗ 2.519∗∗∗ 68.437∗∗∗ 7.710∗∗∗
σ1 6.3× 106 0.607∗∗∗ 2.510∗∗∗ 77.964∗∗∗
σ2 5.8× 107∗∗∗ 5.381∗∗∗ 3.621∗∗∗ 64.050∗∗∗
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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results of section (2.3.1), liquidity spillovers increase significantly and become more
volatile during periods of major financial and political events.
Although these results are in line with the theories discussed in section (2.4), they
are different in spirit from the results in a sizeable international finance literature.
Bekaert and Harvey (1995) and Bekaert and Harvey (2003) provide evidence of time–
varying market integration in international markets. In particular, they show that
during periods of financial turmoil, the degree of integration in international markets
decreases and thus, there is lower contagion. These results, although different from
the results of this paper, can be explained by a number of regularities that exist
in international markets. International markets, for instance, are controlled by the
respective countries which, during periods of financial turmoil, can take actions to
protect their domestic markets, decreasing effectively contagion. Such interventions
are not possible (or are less likely) within a country.
2.3.3 Robustness Checks
In untabulated results, I check a number of other possible explanations for the
results. First, I examine the sensitivity of the results to the choice of rollover periods.
I vary the period from 3 years to an increasing number of years (adding one day in
each iteration). The results remain unchanged.
This paper estimates a reduced–form VAR and as such, it does not capture, by
construction, the contemporaneous effects. In other words, it may be that during
periods of low (lagged) liquidity spillovers, liquidity spillovers happen contempora-
neously, and vice versa. If that is the case, then one would conclude that liquidity
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Figure 2.5: The Markov switching model is defined as in eq. (2.9). The figure plots
the average liquidity spillovers on a monthly frequency (panel a), the
conditional volatility (panel b), the conditional mean (panel c), and the
state probabilities (panel d). State 1 [2] corresponds to the state with
low [high] conditional mean and variance.
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spillovers are not changing over time, but what changes over time is the timing
(contemporaneous vs. lagged) of said spillovers. To avoid imposing structural as-
sumptions, I address this concern by directly examining the time series properties
of the covariances and indirectly through the alternative specification. The alterna-
tive specification takes into account both the variances and covariances, and thus
indirectly addresses the concern of time varying contemporaneous effects. Both the
alternative and main specification find similar results, which implies that covariances
are not the driving variables. In untabulated results, I also find that covariances do
not change significantly between periods of high and low liquidity spillovers. These
results suggest that contemporaneous effects do not change between the two states
and thus, it is not the contemporaneous effects that drive the main results of this
papers.
In the main specification, I detrend the modified Amihud (2002) measure and re-
move the persistent component using an ARMA(1,1) process. Although this filtering
process addresses concerns regarding the time series properties that may affect the
conclusions of further analysis, it nevertheless comes with a tradeoff, i.e., the difficulty
to clearly interpret the results of the subsequent analysis. As a robustness check, l
also use the raw modified Amihud (2002) measure (as in eq. 2.2 and figure 2.1) in the
VAR(4) and generate liquidity spillovers. Figure 2.6 shows the liquidity spillovers to
each asset without the trend and ARMA(1,1) corrections. One immediately notices
that the main difference between figure 2.3 and 2.6 is the magnitude of spikes and not
their positions. That is, both the methods predict high and low liquidity spillovers at
the same time periods, the magnitudes however for the high liquidity periods differ
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but not significantly. Figure 2.6 (green line) plots the (equally–weighted) average
liquidity spillovers using the raw Amihud (2002) measure as liquidity. The blue line
plots the original liquidity spillovers. The main difference between the two series is
for the 1992 and post–1994 periods, during which the non–corrected series predict
higher liquidity spillovers.
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Figure 2.6: Each liquidity spillover pair is defined as in eq. (2.8) and liquidity is
defined as the raw modified Amihud measure (eq. 2.2), i.e., without any
trend or persistence corrections. The figure plots the equally weighted
average of liquidity spillovers across the three assets to one asset. That
is, spillovers to CL show the average spillovers from TYF, SP, and ED to
CL. To improve the readability of the plot, the daily spillovers have been
averaged to the monthly frequency. I standardize each series to have zero
mean and unit variance for convenience.
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Figure 2.7: The figure plots the equally weighted average of liquidity spillovers across the 12 spillover pairs.
The blue line plots the liquidity spillovers after liquidity has been corrected for trend and per-
sistence. The green line plots the liquidity spillovers without any corrections for trend and per-
sistence, i.e., liquidity is defined as the raw modified Amihud measure (eq. 2.2). The average
is computed after each spillover pair is standardized to zero mean and unit variance. Daily
spillovers have been averaged to the monthly frequency. The shaded areas represent periods of
major financial and macroeconomics events.
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2.4 Transmission Channels of Liquidity Across Assets
In the theoretical literature, liquidity spillovers are attributed to two sets of fric-
tions and transmission channels, namely, information channels (cross–market rebal-
ancing and information heterogeneity) and liquidity supply channels (funding con-
straints and traders’ risk aversion). These models provide the theoretical underpin-
ning of this empirical investigation of liquidity spillovers. In this section, to illustrate
the intuition of these models, I briefly discuss the proposed transmission channels.
2.4.1 Cross–Market Rebalancing
Kodres and Pritsker (2002) use a multi–asset extension of the noisy rational
expectation model of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) to show that, in the presence of
cross–market rebalancing, liquidity may spill across assets because of fundamental
uncertainty about future asset values and information asymmetry. They describe
an economy populated by informed (risk–averse) traders who receive homogeneous
private signals and optimally choose their exposure to systematic risk factors across
markets. Informed traders respond to shocks in one market by optimally re–adjusting
their portfolios in other markets. If the portfolio rebalancing happens in markets with
information asymmetry, liquidity spillovers can occur.
2.4.2 Heterogeneous Information
Pasquariello (2007), who uses a multi–asset, multi–trader extension of Kyle (1985),
attributes liquidity spillovers to shocks in the degree of information heterogeneity
among sophisticated market participants. He shows that, even in the absence of risk
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aversion, heterogeneously informed speculators may trade strategically across assets
in order to reveal less of their informational advantage. Shocks to market wide infor-
mation heterogeneity therefore, may affect the equilibrium liquidity of many markets
by making the inference of market makers more difficult in all affected markets. In
other words, such shocks make market makers more vulnerable to adverse selection
from strategic trading.
2.4.3 Traders’ Funding Constraints
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), use a model similar in spirit to Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980), to argue that liquidity spillovers across assets may stem from
traders’ funding constraints. They consider an economy where uninformed traders
(speculators) provide liquidity across assets and finance their trades through collater-
alized borrowing, on a margin, from financiers. Speculators can face funding liquidity
constraints either through higher margins, a decline in the value of the assets they
hold, or both.
In such an economy, liquidity has commonality across assets because shocks to
funding liquidity (capital constraints) affect all assets in which speculators are sup-
plying liquidity. For spillovers to arise however, speculators must have high leverage,
i.e., they must be close to their funding constraints or risk hitting their funding
constraints, and markets must be illiquid.
2.4.4 Traders’ Risk Aversion
Kyle and Xiong (2001) attribute liquidity spillovers across assets to shocks to
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traders’ risk aversion. They model an economy with (convergence) traders who bet
in multiple markets against short–lived deviations of prices from their fundamen-
tal values induced by noise trading. Trading losses in any one market, especially
when large, reduce traders’ willingness to bear risk, motivating them to liquidate
positions in other markets. This wealth effect may result in reduced liquidity and
increased price volatility across different markets. Liquidity thus, has commonal-
ity across assets because shocks to traders’ risk aversion may lead them to manage
their positions across all assets more conservatively, amplifying and transmitting the
effects of a shock from one market to another.
2.4.5 Liquidity
The aforementioned models of information and liquidity supply use different but
related notions of liquidity. In Kodres and Pritsker (2002) and Pasquariello (2007)
liquidity is defined as market depth in face of adverse selection risk from the informa-
tiveness of order flow – which, in these models, depends on market wide fundamental
uncertainty and information heterogeneity. In Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)
liquidity is defined broadly as market quality, measured as the (absolute) distance
between an asset’s transaction price and its fundamental value.10 The extent to
which however, the former approaches the latter depends on fundamental volatil-
ity and noise trading and thus, adverse selection risk. The two notions of liquidity
therefore, are expected to be empirically highly correlated.
Accordingly, in this paper, I focus on spillovers across proxies for observed market
10Kyle and Xiong (2001), although not explicitly, rely on the same notion of liquidity.
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depth.
2.5 State Variables
The evidence presented in this paper confirms the notion postulated by all the
theories discussed in section (2.4); liquidity spillovers are an intrinsic and important
feature of price formation in financial markets. Each theory predicts a state variable
that explains the cross–section and time–series of liquidity spillovers. In this and
next section, I investigate the specific channels through which the spillovers may
take place.
According to the cross–market rebalancing channel, fundamental uncertainty
about future asset values and information asymmetry explain liquidity spillovers.
Fundamental uncertainty arises from the uncertainty about the future macroeco-
nomic state, which is measured by the realizations of macroeconomic factors. To test
the cross–market portfolio rebalancing thus, I use monthly changes in unemployment,
changes in personal consumption expenditures, and the Chicago Feds monthly index
of U.S. real activity (CFNAI) as possible macroeconomic factors. Monthly data on
these series are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Figure 2.8
plots the monthly changes on PCE, the CFNAI, and the unemployment rate. All
measures comove and increase during major financial crises.
Kodres and Pritsker (2002) predict that higher [lower] fundamental uncertainty
predicts higher [lower] (absolute) liquidity spillovers (Hypotheses 1 ).
The information heterogeneity channel predicts that increased heterogeneity in
private signals explains increased liquidity spillovers. To proxy for information het-
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Figure 2.8: The figures plot monthly changes in the Personal Consumption Expendi-
tures (PCE), the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI), and the
unemployment rate. The data on PCE and unemployment are obtained
from the St. Louis Fed and data on CFNAI are from the Chicago Fed.
The changes in PCE are monthly changes on the seasonally adjusted
expenditures. The unemployment rate refers to civilian unemployment.
CFNAI is designed to capture the current and future course of U.S. eco-
nomic activity and inflation. It uses 85 economic indicators drawn from
Production and Income, Employment, Unemployment, and Hours, Per-
sonal Consumption and Housing, and Sales, Orders, and Inventories.
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erogeneity I use a measure of dispersion in beliefs. To calculate a proxy for the
difference in beliefs about fundamentals, sampled at the monthly frequency, I use
the Survey of Professional Forecasters, managed by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia, and Michigan’s Consumer Confidence index. Given that I am inter-
ested in heterogeneity regarding macroeconomic fundamentals, it is most fitting to
use dispersion of beliefs about macroeconomic fundamentals rather than firm–specific
fundamentals. From the Survey of Professional Forecasters, I use the quarterly indi-
vidual forecasts about the one quarter ahead Price Index of GDP, the level of Real
GDP, the level of unemployment, and the index of industrial production. From the
University of Michigan’s survey, I use their monthly Consumer Confidence index.
Each survey serves a different goal; the Survey of Professional Forecasters is based
on the opinions of market professionals while the consumer confidence index is a
barometer of household opinions. Additionally, the consumer confidence index is
constructed at a monthly frequency, allowing me to create a monthly index of dis-
persion in beliefs. I compute the time series of the cross-sectional standard deviations
of the forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters and then aggregate the
information from the two time series by computing the first principal component.
This gives me a proxy sampled at a monthly frequency. Figure 2.9 plots the first
principal component. As expected, the dispersion index spikes during periods of
major financial and political events.
The information heterogeneity channel of Pasquariello (2007) predicts that higher
[lower] information heterogeneity predicts higher [lower] absolute liquidity spillovers
(Hypotheses 2 ).
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Figure 2.9: The figure plots the monthly dispersion in beliefs measure. I create the
measure using the survey of Professional Forecasters and Michigan’s Con-
sumer Confidence Index. From the Survey of Professional Forecasters, I
use the quarterly individual forecasts about the one quarter ahead Price
Index of GDP, the level of Real GDP, the level of unemployment, and the
index of industrial production. From the University of Michigan’s survey,
I use their monthly Consumer Confidence index. To generate a monthly
series, I compute the time series of the cross-sectional standard devia-
tions of the forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters and
then aggregate the information from the two time series by computing
the first principal component.
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According to Kyle and Xiong (2001), an increase in traders’ risk aversion implies
an increase in liquidity spillovers. I use the difference between the implied and
expected volatilities as an indicator of the representative agent’s risk aversion11.
The data are publicly available on Hao Zhou’s website.12 The implied volatility is
based on monhtly VIX (S&P500 options implied volatilities), as computed by the
Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOE). The expected volatilities are computed
from intraday data for the S&P500 composite index and are model–free. Figure
2.10 plots the risk aversion measure, which spikes during periods characterized by
financial turmoil. The risk aversion measure is highly persistent and for the time–
series regressions of the next section, I use the percentage difference.
Finally, based on the traders’ funding constraints channel proposed by Brun-
nermeier and Pedersen (2009) and Gromb and Vayanos (2012), tightening funding
conditions should explain increases in liquidity spillovers. I proxy for funding con-
ditions using the leverage factor of Adrian et al. (2014). The factor is constructed
as the seasonally adjusted log changes in the level of broker–dealer leverage, which
are available on quarterly frequency. To bypass the frequency problem (inference
on quarterly data would be very problematic in this setup), I use the monthly re-
turns on their leverage factor mimicking portfolio, that uses the excess returns of the
six Fama–French benchmark portfolios on size (Small and Big) and book–to–market
(Low, Medium and High) in excess of the risk-free rate and the momentum factor. I
obtain the monthly data from Kenneth French’s website and the CRSP.
Tightening funding constraints imply decrease in the leverage of liquidity providers.
11see, again, Rosenberg and Engle (2002), Bakshi and Madan (2006), and Bollerslev et al. (2009)
12https://sites.google.com/site/haozhouspersonalhomepage/
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Figure 2.10: The figure plots the monthly risk aversion measure of Bollerslev et al.
(2009), who define it as the difference between implied volatility (VIX)
and expected volatility computed from intraday data on the S&P500
composite index. The data are at the monthly frequency.
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Decreasing returns on the leverage factor mimicking portfolio therefore, are associ-
ated with decreasing leverage, which in turn is associated with tightening funding
conditions. Figure 2.11 plots the log–changes on the quarterly Adrian et al. (2014)
leverage factor and the returns on the leverage factor mimicking portfolio used in this
paper. The plots suggest that indeed large decreases in leverage are associated with
times of macroeconomic and financial turmoil, in line with the idea that decreases
in leverage happen when funding is tight and marginal value of intermediary wealth
is high.
The liquidity supply channels are not symmetric channels, i.e., they predict higher
liquidity spillovers when either risk aversion of traders’ funding constraints are higher
(Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4, respectively), but not lower liquidity spillovers if
these state variables are lower.13
2.5.1 Time–series regressions
For each state variable, I run the following baseline time–series regression,
∆LSPILLt = α + βXt + t, (2.12)
where ∆LSPILLt is the monthly (equally–weighted) average liquidity spillover,
Xt ∈ {Leverage, Risk Aversion, Change in Unemployment, Change in Consump-
tion, Chicago Fed Real Activity Index, Dispersion Index }. I use changes in liquidity
spillovers because LSPILLt is highly persistent. Table 2.4 shows the results. Newey–
West HAC standard errors with 3 lags are reported.
13To correct for outliers, I winsorize the data at the bottom and top 1%.
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Figure 2.11: The figures plot the leverage factor (changes in log–leverage) and the
returns of the leverage factor mimicking portfolio. The leverage factor is
obtained from Adrian et al. (2014) who create the factor using quarterly
Flow of Funds data. The leverage factor is computed as seasonally
adjusted changes in log leverage of security broker–dealers on a quarterly
frequency. The series has been standardized to have zero mean and unit
variance. The leverage factor mimicking portfolio is created using the
excess (of risk free rate) returns of the six Fama–French portfolios on
size and book–to–market, and the momentum factor. The returns are
on the monthly frequency.
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Column (1) and (7) of Table 2.4 show the result of the state–variable regressions.
The leverage coefficient is negative, -0.319, and significant at the 5% level. This
finding of relationship between traders’ funding constraints and liquidity spillovers
is one of the main results in this paper. As mentioned in section 2.5, a decrease
in the leverage of broker–dealers is associated with tightening funding conditions.
Therefore, the lower are the returns of the mimicking portfolio, the more the liquid-
ity providers delever (leverage decreases), i.e., the tighter the funding constraints,
and thus, according to Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), the higher the liquidity
spillovers.
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Table 2.4: Time–Series State Variable Regression
This Table reports the results of the following regression:
∆LSPILLt = α+ βXt + t,
where ∆LSPILLt is the monthly changes in liquidity spillover, Xt ∈ {Leverage, Risk Aversion, Change in
Unemployment, Change in Consumption, Chicago Fed Real Activity Index, Dispersion Index }. Leverage
are the monthly returns of the leverage factor mimicking portfolio of Adrian et al. (2014), Risk Aversion is
the monthly changes in the difference between Implied and Estimated volatility as in Bollerslev et al. (2009),
∆Unemployment is the monthly changes in the [UNRATE] from Fred, ∆PCE is the monthly changes in the
personal consumption expenditures from Fred, and CFNAI is the monthly changes in the Chicago Fed’s U.S.
real activity index, Dispersion is the monthly first principal component of the dispersion in beliefs measure.
Newey– West HAC standard errors (with 3 lags; monthly data) are reported in brackets.
∆LSPILL ∆LSPILL ∆LSPILL ∆LSPILL ∆LSPILL ∆LSPILL ∆LSPILL
Leverage(Mimicking) -0.347∗∗ -0.319∗
[-3.52] [-2.48]
Risk Aversion -0.013 -0.011
[-1.49] [-1.16]
∆Unemployment -0.321 0.032
[-0.26] [0.02]
∆PCE 8.942 8.649
[1.07] [0.82]
CFNAI 2.663 1.464
[1.21] [0.38]
Dispersion -1.978 -3.145
[-1.01] [-1.35]
Obs. 223 223 223 223 223 223 223
t statistics in brackets
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The bootstrapped critical values for the respective levels are: 3.716, 4.7145, 5.8523
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Due to the fact that I essentially test 6 different state variables, the statistical
tests would be unreliable if this is not reflected in the choice of critical values. I
adjust critical values for the t–statistics by block bootstrapping the six liquidity
spillover models. The block bootstrap addresses serial correlation in the residuals,
among others. I provide more details regarding the block bootstrap in the appendix.
The adjusted critical values for the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% are 3.716, 4.7145, and 5.635
respectively. With the bootstrapped critical values the leverage measure remains
significant under the 10% level.
Table 2.5 shows the results of the time–series regressions with the alternative
definition of liquidity spillovers. The alternative definition is described and discussed
in the appendix. The alternative liquidity spillovers are defined in eq. (E.2) and the
average alternative liquidity spillover is defined as the equally weighted sum of the
liquidity spillover pairs. Column (7) shows the main result and confirms the results
of the main specification; liquidity spillovers are explained by the returns of the
leverage factor mimicking portfolio.
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Table 2.5: Time–Series State Variable Regression – Alternative Definition of Liquidity Spillovers
This Table reports the results of the following regression:
∆LSPILLt = α+ βXt + t,
where ∆LSPILLt is the monthly changes in the average liquidity spillover as defined in equation E.2, Xt ∈
{Leverage, Risk Aversion, Change in Unemployment, Change in Consumption, Chicago Fed Real Activity
Index, Dispersion Index }. Leverage are the monthly returns of the leverage factor mimicking portfolio of
Adrian et al. (2014), Risk Aversion is the monthly changes in the difference between Implied and Estimated
volatility as in Bollerslev et al. (2009), ∆Unemployment is the monthly changes in the [UNRATE] from
Fred, ∆PCE is the monthly changes in the personal consumption expenditures from Fred, and CFNAI is
the monthly changes in the Chicago Fed’s U.S. real activity index, Dispersion is the monthly first principal
component of the dispersion in beliefs measure. Newey– West HAC standard errors (with 3 lags; monthly
data) are reported in brackets.
∆LSPILL ∆LSPILL ∆LSPILL ∆LSPILL ∆LSPILL ∆LSPILL ∆LSPILL
Leverage(Mimicking) -0.087∗ -0.087∗
[-1.98] [-2.08]
Risk Aversion -0.001 0.004
[-0.71] [1.85]
∆Unemployment 0.498∗∗∗ -0.188
[3.15] [-0.66]
∆PCE -2.160∗∗ 8.068∗
[-2.69] [1.99]
CFNAI -2.304∗∗∗ -1.360
[-5.33] [-1.07]
Dispersion -1.122 -0.530
[-1.80] [-0.70]
Obs. 223 223 223 223 223 223 223
t statistics in brackets
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The bootstrapped critical values for the respective levels are: 3.716, 4.7145, 5.8523
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2.6 Conclusion
This paper examines liquidity spillovers across four different asset classes traded
in the U.S. futures market, namely, Crude Oil, 10–year T–Note, Eurodollar, and
S&P500. Concentrating on the futures alleviates any microstructure concerns raised
when comparing the liquidity of assets traded in different environments. Liquidity
spillovers from asset i to asset j are estimated via a reduced–form VAR and defined
as the improvement of fit stemming from allowing for lagged liquidity shocks in asset
i to affect liquidity in asset j. This specification is free of any structural assumptions.
The results of this paper can be summarized as following. There are significant,
time–varying liquidity spillovers across the four assets. The average liquidity spillover
is governed by two states; a state (1) of low spillovers (low mean and variance) and
a state (2) of high spillovers (high mean and variance). State (2) coincides with
periods typically characterized as periods of financial and macroeconomic turmoil.
A number of theories predict liquidity spillovers. These theories can be character-
ized as information and liquidity supply based theories. Information based theories
discussed in this paper are the cross–market rebalancing proposed by Kodres and
Pritsker (2002) and information heterogeneity by Pasquariello (2007). Liquidity sup-
ply based channels are the traders’ risk–aversion channel of Kyle and Xiong (2001)
and the traders’ funding constraints channel of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009).
The findings of this paper provide the strongest support for the Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2009) liquidity transmission channel that predicts that spillovers arise dur-
ing periods of crises and when speculators have high leverage, i.e., when they are
close (or risk being close) to their funding constraints.
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APPENDIX A
Election and Liquidity: Variation across Industries
This table reports the results of the following regression:
yit = µi + λt + qt + β11t(Election) + εit ,∀n ∈ {1, . . . , 12}
where y ∈ {Retit, log(τit), ILLIQit, Zerosit} and Election is either a pre–Election or post–Election
dummy.Retit are the cumulative excess log returns, over the value–weighted market portfolio,
for the September–November pre–election period and December–January post election period.
log(τit), log(ILLIQit), and Zerosit are the log turnover, the log Amihud (2002) illiquidity mea-
sure, and the fraction of zero returns, as defined in eq. 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 respectively. In this
specification, the explanatory variables are dummy variables that are equal to one prior to elections
(1t(pre–Election)) and after the elections (1t(post–Election)), and zero otherwise. In other words,
the comparison is between the September–October period (November–January or February–April)
of an election year and the same period for all non election years. We run this specification for
each industry separately. Firm, year, and quarter fixed effects are included to account for all the
time–invariant differences within the firms and across time. Standard errors are clustered by time.
Industry No. Ret log(τ) ILLIQ Zeros Vol
Pre–Election Dummy
Continued on next page
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Industry No. Ret log(τ) ILLIQ Zeros Vol
Non–Durable (1) 0.008∗ −0.075∗∗∗ -0.869 0.009∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
[0.003] [0.008] [0.554] [0.001] [0.0002]
Durable (2) 0.014∗∗ −0.049∗∗∗ -0.157 0.006∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
[0.006] [0.013] [1.056] [0.002] [0.0003]
Manufacturing (3) 0.014∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗ -0.391 0.005∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
[0.003] [0.006] [0.249] [0.001] [0.0002]
Energy (4) −0.020∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗ 1.264 0.003 −0.001∗∗
[0.005] [0.013] [1.254] [0.002] [0.00003]
Chemicals (5) 0.018∗∗∗ −0.104∗∗∗ -1.361 0.007∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
[0.005] [0.013] [0.784] [0.002] [0.0003]
Business Equip. (6) 0.006 −0.104∗∗∗ 0.964∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
[0.004] [0.008] [0.373] [0.001] [0.0002]
Telecommunicat. (7) -0.003 −0.106∗∗∗ 2.570∗ 0.007∗∗ -0.000
[0.010] [0.020] [1.257] [0.002] [0.0005]
Utilities (8) −0.009∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗ -0.171 0.010∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
[0.003] [0.009] [0.154] [0.002] [0.0002]
Shop. (9) 0.021∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗ -0.355 0.008∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
[0.004] [0.008] [0.465] [0.001] [0.0002]
Health (10) −0.012∗ −0.143∗∗∗ 0.428 0.010∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
[0.006] [0.010] [0.259] [0.002] [0.0003]
Money (11) 0.022∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗ 0.4263 0.007∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
[0.003] [0.007] [0.678] [0.001] [0.0002]
Other (12) 0.017∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ -0.371 0.002 −0.002∗∗∗
[0.003] [0.008] [0.540] [0.001] [0.0001]
Pre–Election Dummy
Non–Durable (1) 0.012∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ -1.176 −0.003∗∗ 0.000
[0.003] [0.008] [0.668] [0.001] [0.0002]
Durable (2) 0.013∗ -0.001 −0.902∗ -0.001 0.000
[0.006] [0.013] [0.450] [0.002] [0.0004]
Manufacturing (3) 0.006∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.029 −0.004∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗
[0.003] [0.006] [0.208] [0.001] [0.0001]
Energy (4) 0.028∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ -0.867 −0.006∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
[0.006] [0.013] [0.824] [0.002] [0.0005]
Chemicals (5) 0.0021 0.021 -0.538 -0.003 0.000
[0.006] [0.013] [0.443] [0.002] [0.0003]
Continued on next page
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Industry No. Ret log(τ) ILLIQ Zeros Vol
Business Equip. (6) 0.0105∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ -0.426 -0.001 0.001∗∗∗
[0.004] [0.007] [0.284] [0.001] [0.0002]
Telecommunicat. (7) 0.016 0.060∗∗ 0.389 -0.004 0.005∗∗∗
[0.011] [0.020] [0.577] [0.003] [0.0007]
Utilities (8) −0.006∗∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.283∗∗ -0.000 0.0008∗∗∗
[0.003] [0.009] [0.099] [0.002] [0.0002]
Shop. (9) 0.015∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 1.235 -0.002 0.0003
[0.004] [0.008] [1.053] [0.001] [0.0003]
Health (10) 0.052∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.599 −0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
[0.006] [0.011] [0.370] [0.001] [0.0005]
Money (11) 0.029∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ -0.009 −0.008∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
[0.003] [0.007] [0.355] [0.001] [0.0001]
Other (12) 0.016∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ -1.618 −0.005∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
[0.003] [0.008] [0.986] [0.001] [0.0002]
standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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APPENDIX B
Election and Liquidity: Variation across Size
Portfolios
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This table reports the results of the following regression:
ypit = µ
p
i + λ
p
t + qt + β
p
11t(Election) + ε
p
it ∀p ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 10} ,
where y ∈ {Retit, log(τit), ILLIQit, Zerosit} and Election is either a pre–Election or post–Election
dummy.Retit are the cumulative excess log returns, over the value–weighted market portfolio,
for the September–November pre–election period and December–January post election period.
log(τit), log(ILLIQit), and Zerosit are the log turnover, the log Amihud (2002) illiquidity mea-
sure, and the fraction of zero returns, as defined in eq. 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 respectively. In this
specification, the explanatory variables are dummy variables that are equal to one prior to elections
(1t(pre–Election)) and after the elections (1t(post–Election)), and zero otherwise. In other words,
the comparison is between the September–October period (November–January or February–April)
of an election year and the same period for all non election years. We run this specification for each
size portfolio separately. Firm, year, and quarter fixed effects are included to account for all the
time–invariant differences within the firms and across time. Standard errors are clustered by time.
Size Portfolio Ret log(τ) ILLIQ Zeros Vol
Pre–Election Dummy
Small (1) −0.002 −0.098∗∗∗ 1.837 0.002 −0.0009∗∗
[0.005] [0.022] [1.703] [0.002] [0.0004]
(2) 0.014∗ −0.091∗∗∗ -0.141 0.002 −0.0014∗∗∗
[0.004] [0.023] [0.423] [0.002] [0.0003]
(3) 0.016∗∗∗ −0.092∗∗∗ -0.388 0.005∗∗∗ −0.0018∗∗∗
[0.004] [0.031] [0.207] [0.001] [0.0003]
(4) 0.018∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗ 0.122 0.01∗∗∗ −0.0019∗∗
[0.005] [0.031] [0.192] [0.002] [0.0003]
Medium (5) 0.016∗∗∗ −0.092∗∗∗ -0.061 0.012∗∗∗ −0.0019∗∗∗
[0.005] [0.030] [0.055] [0.001] [0.0003]
(6) 0.014∗∗∗ −0.081∗∗∗ −0.088∗ 0.010∗∗∗ −0.0022∗∗∗
[0.004] [0.022] [0.040] [0.001] [0.0003]
(7) 0.010∗ −0.072∗∗∗ -0.037 0.011∗∗∗ −0.0021∗∗∗
[0.004] [0.020] [0.032] [0.001] [0.0005]
(8) 0.014∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗ -0.014 0.010∗∗∗ −0.0017∗∗∗
[0.004] [0.019] [0.014] [0.001] [0.0003]
(9) 0.007∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗ -0.031 0.011∗∗∗ −0.0016∗∗∗
[0.003] [0.017] [0.018] [0.001] [0.0003]
Large (10) 0.001 −0.067∗∗∗ -0.003 0.009∗∗∗ −0.0014∗∗∗
Continued on next page
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Size Portfolio Ret log(τ) ILLIQ Zeros Vol
[0.002] [0.013] [0.004] [0.0007] [0.0003]
Post–Election Dummy
Small (1) 0.031∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ -1.129 −0.008∗∗∗ 0.0021∗∗∗
[0.006] [0.012] [2.00] [0.001] [0.0005]
(2) 0.013∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ -0.418 -0.002 0.0011∗∗∗
[0.005] [0.012] [0.383] [0.002] [0.0003]
(3) 0.018∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.333 -0.002 0.0011∗∗∗
[0.004] [0.012] [0.373] [0.002] [0.0002]
(4) 0.025∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ −0.274∗∗ -0.001 0.0008∗∗∗
[0.005] [0.012] [0.107] [0.001] [0.0003]
Medium (5) 0.026∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ -0.061 -0.000 0.0009∗∗∗
[0.005] [0.011] [0.054] [0.001] [0.0002]
(6) 0.022∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ -0.089 -0.001 0.0009∗∗∗
[0.004] [0.010] [0.054] [0.001] [0.0002]
(7) 0.012∗∗ 0.036∗∗ -0.027 -0.002 0.0005∗∗∗
[0.004] [0.009] [0.048] [0.001] [0.0002]
(8) 0.012∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗ -0.019 -0.0001 0.0007∗∗∗
[0.003] [0.021] [0.015] [0.001] [0.0002]
(9) 0.007∗ 0.046∗∗∗ -0.013 0.0002∗ 0.0005∗∗∗
[0.003] [0.007] [0.012] [0.001] [0.0002]
Large (10) 0.000 0.035∗∗∗ -0.002 0.001 0.001∗∗∗
[0.002] [0.005] [0.010] [0.001] [0.0003]
standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Election and Liquidity: Variation across Beta
Portfolios
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This table reports the results of the following regression:
ypit = µ
p
i + λ
p
t + qt + β
p
11t(Election) + ε
p
it ∀p ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 10} ,
where y ∈ {Retit, log(τit), ILLIQit, Zerosit} and Election is either a pre–Election or post–Election
dummy.Retit are the cumulative excess log returns, over the value–weighted market portfolio,
for the September–November pre–election period and December–January post election period.
log(τit), log(ILLIQit), and Zerosit are the log turnover, the log Amihud (2002) illiquidity mea-
sure, and the fraction of zero returns, as defined in eq. 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 respectively. In this
specification, the explanatory variables are dummy variables that are equal to one prior to elections
(1t(pre–Election)) and after the elections (1t(post–Election)), and zero otherwise. In other words,
the comparison is between the September–October period (November–January or February–April)
of an election year and the same period for all non election years. We run this specification for each
beta portfolio separately. Firm, year, and quarter fixed effects are included to account for all the
time–invariant differences within the firms and across time. Standard errors are clustered by time.
β Portfolio Ret log(τ) ILLIQ Zeros Vol
Pre–Election Dummy
-0.95 (1) −0.054∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗∗ 0.388 0.008∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
[0.014] [0.023] [0.419] [0.002] [0.0007]
-0.49 (2) −0.023∗∗∗ −0.078∗∗∗ -0.2871 0.008∗∗∗ −0.0024∗∗∗
[0.005] [0.021] [0.223] [0.002] [0.0006]
-0.28 (3) −0.005 −0.076∗∗∗ 0.058 0.008∗∗∗ −0.0025∗∗∗
[0.003] [0.023] [0.104] [0.001] [0.0005]
-0.11 (4) −0.012∗∗∗ −0.086∗∗∗ -0.126 0.01∗∗∗ −0.0029∗∗
[0.003] [0.015] [0.111] [0.002] [0.0006]
0.32 (5) 0.006∗ −0.067∗∗∗ -0.240 0.010∗∗∗ −0.0032∗∗∗
[0.003] [0.017] [0.537] [0.001] [0.0007]
0.19 (6) 0.017∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗ −0.873 0.010∗∗∗ −0.0033∗∗∗
[0.003] [0.010] [0.550] [0.001] [0.0007]
0.36 (7) 0.025∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗ -0.466 0.009∗∗∗ −0.0036∗∗∗
[0.004] [0.020] [0.299] [0.001] [0.001]
0.57 (8) 0.034∗∗∗ −0.078∗∗∗ -0.995 0.007∗∗∗ −0.0035∗∗∗
[0.008] [0.021] [0.573] [0.001] [0.0008]
0.86 (9) 0.048∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗ 0.208 0.008∗∗∗ −0.0036∗∗∗
[0.015] [0.020] [0.716] [0.001] [0.0006]
1.54 (10) 0.069∗∗∗ −0.091∗∗∗ -1.008 0.006∗∗∗ −0.0037∗∗∗
Continued on next page
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Size Portfolio Ret log(τ) ILLIQ Zeros Vol
[0.017] [0.028] [0.831] [0.0015] [0.0008]
Post–Election Dummy
-0.95 (1) 0.034∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.309 −0.008∗∗∗ −0.0000
[0.006] [0.011] [0.414] [0.002] [0.0002]
-0.49 (2) 0.023∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ −0.533∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗ −0.0002
[0.004] [0.009] [0.163] [0.001] [0.0003]
-0.28 (3) 0.120∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ -0.258 −0.003∗ −0.0003
[0.003] [0.009] [0.145] [0.001] [0.0002]
-0.11 (4) 0.021∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ -0.061 −0.002 −0.0005∗∗
[0.004] [0.008] [0.254] [0.001] [0.0002]
0.32 (5) 0.014∗ 0.044∗∗∗ -0.049 −0.005∗∗∗ −0.0004∗
[0.004] [0.009] [0.324] [0.001] [0.0002]
0.19 (6) 0.007 0.0501∗∗∗ 0.673 −0.004∗∗ −0.0005∗∗
[0.004] [0.008] [0.718] [0.001] [0.0002]
0.36 (7) 0.003 0.034∗∗∗ −0.733∗∗ −0.004∗∗ −0.0004
[0.004] [0.009] [0.282] [0.001] [0.0002]
0.57 (8) 0.004 0.047∗∗∗ -1.832 −0.001 −0.001∗∗∗
[0.004] [0.009] [1.257] [0.001] [0.0002]
0.86 (9) 0.003 0.031∗∗∗ 1.08∗ −0.004∗∗ −0.0014∗∗∗
[0.004] [0.009] [0.514] [0.001] [0.0002]
1.54 (10) 0.006 0.032∗∗∗ −3.039∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.0019∗∗∗
[0.005] [0.009] [0.901] [0.001] [0.0003]
standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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APPENDIX D
Restricted VAR – EGLS
I consistently estimate the restricted VAR by feasible GLS (estimated – EGLS).
I follow Lu¨tkepohl (2005), where a more extended discussion can be found.
The K–dimensional (K = 12) covariance stationary VAR(4) process is:
yt = α +
4∑
i=1
Φiyt−i + et ⇐⇒ yt = ν + A1yt−1 + A2tt−2 + A3yt−3 + A4yt−4 + yt,
where Ai are the companion matrices. This can be re–written in a matrix form as:
Y = BX + U
where Y
K×T
= (y1, . . . , tT ), B
K×(Kp+1)
= (ν A1 . . . A4), X
(Kp+1)×T
= (X0, . . . XT−1), and
U
K×T
= (u1, . . . , uT ). The multivariate least squares estimator is:
Bˆ = Y X ′(X ′X)−1
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Σˆu =
(Y − BˆX)(Y − BˆX)′
T −Kp− 1
Suppose that the linear constraints (Granger type exclusion restrictions) for B are
given in the following form:
β = vec(B) = Rγ + r,
where γ is the vector of unrestricted parameters (4 × 1, given that p = 4), R is the
K(Kp+ 1)×4 matrix of known weights, and r is the K(Kp+ 1)×1 vector of known
constants. This is not the conventional way of representing linear constraints but
it is adopted by Lu¨tkepohl (2005) for convenience. Let us now derive the estimated
GLS estimator, γ.
Y = BX+U ⇐⇒ vec(Y ) = (X ′⊗IK)vec(B)+vec(U) ⇐⇒ y = (X ′⊗IK)β+u ⇐⇒
y = (X ′ ⊗ IK)(Rγ + r) + u ⇐⇒ y − (X ′ ⊗ IK)r︸ ︷︷ ︸
x
= (X ′ ⊗ IK)Rγ + u
The estimator in a restricted VAR,γˆ, is defined to minimize the following sum of
squared errors, S(γ), rather than then standard u′u
S(γ) = u′(IT ⊗ Σ−1u )u
and from the previous equation, that is equal to:
S(γ) = [x− (X ⊗ IK)Rγ]′(IT ⊗ Σ−1u )[x− (X ⊗ IK)Rγ].
106
Thus, γˆ is
γˆ = [R′(XX ′ ⊗ Σ−1u )R]−1R′(X ⊗ Σ−1u )x,
which requires the knowledge of Σu, which is unknown. Using a consistent estimator
Σ¯u, one gets an estimated GLS estimator
ˆˆγ = [R′(XX ′ ⊗ Σ¯−1u )R]−1R′(X ⊗ Σ¯−1u )x.
As a consistent estimator of Σu, I use the restricted least square estimator based on
minimizing u′u with respect to γ. The minimizing γ–vector is:
γˆ = [R′(XX ′ ⊗R]−1R′(X⊗)x.
Denote the corresponding β–vector as:
βr = Rγˆr + r
and
Σˆru =
(Y − BˆrX)(Y − BˆrX)′
T
.
Note that the adjustment for the degrees of freedom is not clear. For proofs on the
consistency of the estimator see Lu¨tkepohl (2005).
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APPENDIX E
Alternative Specification of Liquidity
To perform robustness checks, I consider an alternative, yet conceptually equiv-
alent, definition of liquidity spillovers that concentrates on the predictive ability of
the reduced–form VAR. In this alternative specification, I define liquidity spillover
from asset i to asset j as the (percentage) change in the one–step ahead forecast
error (FE) of a restricted versus an unrestricted VAR, where the restricted and un-
restricted VAR are defined as in section (2.3.1).
Consider the unrestricted VAR of eq. (2.7). I define the one–step ahead forecast
error as,
FEt = log(det[Σ¯u]) +
2
T
(K2p− r), (E.1)
where T is the length of the sample, p the lag order, K the dimension of the
time–series, r the number of linear restrictions, and Σ¯u the least–squares estimated
variance–covariance matrix of errors. See appendix for derivation. The lower is the
prediction error, the better is the model at forecasting. This prediction error is very
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similar to the Akaike information criterion and as such is a tradeoff between the
parsimony of the model and the fit.
Liquidity spillovers from asset i to asset j are then defined as
Spillij,t =
FErij,t − FEut
FErij,t=1
, (E.2)
where FErij,t is the one–step ahead forecast error when the asset’s j liquidity, return,
and volatility coefficients are restricted to zero in the asset’s i liquidity equation.
FErij,t=1 is the restricted forecast error at the beginning of the sample. An increase
[decrease] in Spillij,t implies higher [lower] liquidity spillovers from asset i to asset j.
Although forecasting is not among the goals of this project, this alternative def-
inition of spillovers allows me to take advantage of the entire variance–covariance
matrix and thus, consider both the covariance and variance. It is also a more di-
rect measure of the one–step ahead liquidity spillover. The main drawback of this
measure however is the fact that is non–stationary.
Figure E.1 plots the unrestricted FEt. As one might have expected, the model is
better (lower FEt) at predicting during non–turmoil periods. FEt spikes during pe-
riods that are characterized by financial crises. Figure E.2 plots the equally weighted
average of each pair of alternative liquidity spillovers. To improve readability of the
plots, the frequency is monthly. In summary, the average liquidity spillover follows a
pattern similar to that of the unrestricted FEt and the main liquidity spillover spec-
ification (eq. (2.8). That is, liquidity spillovers spike during periods of financial and
macroeconomic turmoil. This measure is also more volatile than the MSE measure
since it depends on the entire variance–covariance matrix.
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Figure E.1: The figure plots the unrestricted one–step ahead prediction error that is
defined in eq. (E.8). The smaller the value of the prediction error the
better is the model at forecasting.
110
Figure E.2: The figure plots the average of the alternative definition of liquidity
spillovers. Each alternative liquidity spillover pair is defined as in eq.
(E.2) and the average is defined as the equally weighted sum. To improve
readability of plot, the frequency is monthly.
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The MSE[yˆt(h)] of an h–step ahead forecast is,
MSE[yˆt(h)] = E{[yt+h − yˆt(h)][yt+h − yˆt(h)]′}, (E.3)
and the approximate one–step ahead forecast MSE is given by (see Lu¨tkepohl (2005),
p.94 for proof)
MSE(1) =
T +Kp+ 1
T
Σu, (E.4)
where T is the length of the sample, p the lag order, K the dimension of the time–
series, and Σu the variance–covariance matrix of errors. To make the MSE(1) op-
erational, Akaike (1969) suggests replacing the unknown Σu by the least–square
estimate, such that
MSE(1) =
T +Kp+ 1
T −Kp− 1Σ¯u, (E.5)
where Σ¯u is estimated. To obtain a scalar measure of forecast accuracy, Akaike
(1969) focuses on the determinant of this measure
MSE(1) = det[
T +Kp+ 1
T −Kp− 1Σ¯u] = [
T +Kp+ 1
T −Kp− 1]
Kdet[Σ¯u]. (E.6)
Given that both the restricted and the unrestricted prediction error have the same
[T+Kp+1
T−Kp−1 ]
K , I disregard that term. To re–scale the measure, I take its log,
log(MSE(1)) = log(det[Σ¯u]). (E.7)
As in the Akaike Information Criterion, the log(det[Σ¯u]) is a measure of the fit of
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the model. To control for overfitting in small samples, Akaike adds a penalty term,
2(K2p+K)
T
. I modify the model to account for the number of linear restrictions. I.e.,
FEt = log(det[Σ¯u]) +
2
T
(K2p− r), (E.8)
where r is the number of linear restrictions. The deduction of the number of linear
restrictions decreases the penalty and benefits the restricted model in terms of its
fit.
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APPENDIX F
Alternative Exclusion Restrictions
In the main specification, for each pair of liquidity spillovers the restricted MSE
imposes exclusion restrictions on the relevant liquidity. For instance, when mea-
suring the liquidity spillovers from Crude Oil to S&P500, I set to zero the lagged
coefficients of Crude Oil’s liquidity in S&P500’s liquidity equation. This specifica-
tion takes into account only the direct liquidity spillovers and ignores the indirect
channel of potential spillovers through returns and volatility. Prior research (see for
instance, Chordia et al. (2005) and Goyenko and Ukhov (2009)) however shows that
such indirect channels are significant and such findings are justified by the theoret-
ical microstructure literature on the determinants of liquidity. In this paper, when
performing Granger–causality tests, I do not find strong indirect channels (see Table
2.2, liquidity raws) of liquidity spillovers. Nonetheless, as a robustness check, in
this section I compute each pair of liquidity spillovers by imposing exclusion restric-
tions on liquidity, return, and volatility. For example, when measuring the liquidity
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spillovers from Crude Oil to S&P500, I set to zero the lagged coefficients of Crude
Oil’s liquidity, return, and volatility in S&P500’s liquidity equation.
Figure F.1 plots the average liquidity spillovers with the main specification and
the alternative specification, i.e., the different exclusion restrictions. One imme-
diately notices that the two measures are nearly identical with minor differences.
These results confirm our findings in table 2.2., that the indirect liquidity links are
not significant.
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Figure F.1: The figure plots the equally weighted average of liquidity spillovers across the 12 spillover pairs.
The blue line plots the liquidity spillovers with exclusion restrictions applied to liquidity only
(main specification). The green line plots the liquidity spillovers with exclusion restrictions ap-
plied to liquidity, return, and volatility, i.e., taking into account indirect liquidity spillovers. The
average is computed after each spillover pair is standardized to zero mean and unit variance. Daily
spillovers have been averaged to the monthly frequency. The shaded areas represent periods of
major financial and macroeconomics events.
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APPENDIX G
Bootstrapped Critical Values
The estimation of each state–variable separately is essentially a set of six different
equations. The statistical tests however, will be unreliable if they do not reflect the
fact that six different models have been estimated. As Granger (1990) notes, for
instance, “... with a limited amount of data available and a huge number of possible
models ... specification search procedures ... make standard techniques of inference
unreliable”. To adjust therefore for possible data mining one must correct the critical
values to reflect this fact. To adjust the critical values I bootstrap them as following.
My null hypothesis is that the liquidity spillovers are not explained by the state–
variables, i.e.,
H0 : yt = α + ut,
where yt = (y
1
t , . . . , y
12
t ) since there are 12 different spillover pairs. The alternative
specification in each of the six models is that spillovers are explained by the respective
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state variable, i.e,
H1 : yt = αi + βixit + uit, for each i
where i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} for each state variable.
1. I first estimate the alternative models for each state variable, i, to obtain the
residuals, uˆit,
yt = αi + βixit + uit, for each i. (G.1)
That is I run 6 separate regressions, as in (G.1) and save the estimated resid-
uals, uˆit. One could estimate the null model in order to obtain the estimated
residuals, uˆt, but in either case they are consistently estimated.
2. I then bootstrap the null model with a block bootstrap to correct for serial
correlation of residuals, uˆit. That is, first I estimate the null model,
yt = αˆ
R + uˆRt , (G.2)
to obtain the restricted intercept αˆR and do the following block bootstrap for
each alternative specification
y∗t = αˆ
R + uˆ∗it, (G.3)
where the uˆ∗it are the estimated residuals from step 1, equation (G.1). Given
that this specification requires the residuals, uˆit, to be mean zero, one has to
demean the residuals. The length of the block is l = 3 and is chosen based on
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the autocorrelation function of the residuals.
The block–bootstrap proceeds in the following way. I begin by defining b =
T − l+ 1 = 1269− 3 + 1 = 1267 set of overlapping blocks of length l = 3. The
set of blocks I draw from, for each state variable i, is:
uˆ1∗it = (uˆit1 , uˆit2 , uˆit3)
...
uˆ1267∗it = (uˆit1 , uˆit2 , uˆit3),
where t1, t2, t3 correspond to any random time t. I provide a subscript to point
out that each block has distinct times that may be overlapping across blocks.
Now, I can generate bootstrap data by sampling with replacement from the set
{uˆ∗it}bt=1. I concentrate the iid draws of uˆ∗it to form a bootstrap replication of
the original time series of length T of the form (G.3), i.e.,
y∗t = αˆ
R + uˆ∗it.
3. I repeat step (2) 5,000 times allowing me to build up the bootstrap distribution
of the residuals and the dependent variable.
4. For each iteration and each state variable, I estimate
y∗t = αi + βixit + uˆ
∗
it (G.4)
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I.e, using the bootstrap replication of the original time series y∗t , I estimate
(G.4) for each state variable (six times). I repeat step (2) 5,000 times and
obtain six different t–statistics for each βi. I then take the maximum t–statistic
across the six βi.
5. At the completion of step 4, I have 5,000 max t–statistics and I can now
compute the critical values, at the percentile of interest.
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